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Twenty-First Century Formalism
THOMAS B. NACHBAR*
Formalism is one of the most widely applied but misunderstood features of law. Embroiled in a series of conflicts
over the course of the twentieth century, formalism’s meaning has become confused as formalism has been enlisted by
both proponents and opponents of specific legal methodologies. For some, formalism has simply become an epithet
used to describe virtually anything they dislike in legal
thinking. Used often and inconsistently as a stand-in (and
frequently a strawman), formalism’s distinct identity has
been lost, its meaning merged with whatever methodology
it is being used to support or attack.
This Article seeks to separate formalism from those debates, identifying formalism for what it is: a commitment to
form in legal thinking. Form is critical to understanding
law; because law is a shared enterprise, it can only be understood and applied as it exists in some form. Formalism
recognizes the form-bound nature of law and expands on
that recognition by engaging with law in its various forms
rather than as an abstraction.
The Article makes three main contributions to understanding formalism: First, it provides a modern definition
of formalism, separating it from confusion over formalism
caused by its invocation in a series of debates over law in
the twentieth century. Second, it describes how formalism
*

Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to
thank Henry Dickman, John Duffy, Debbie Hellman, Hanaa Khan, Barak Orbach, George Rutherglen, Pierre Schlag, Fred Schauer, Henry Smith, Lawrence
Solum, and participants at a workshop at the University of Virginia School of
Law for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Jordan Barrett
for excellent research assistance.

113

114

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:113

operates in methodologies and contexts beyond textualism
and originalism, the two methodologies with which formalism is usually identified. Third, it explores the power of
formalism beyond its value in determining the content of
law. The form of law is what drives the various ways the
law categorizes conduct, and law’s categories in turn give
meaning to conduct beyond just the application of enforceable legal constraints. It is time for us to bring formalism
into the twenty-first century and recognize it for its distinct
role in understanding law and legal institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Formalism is an approach to law that provokes strong responses. To Roscoe Pound, formalism is the “mechanical jurisprudence”1 he derided. To H.L.A. Hart, formalism is a “vice” that disguises the choices that judges make.2 To Cass Sunstein, it is at
worst a “sham”3 and at best an attempt to make law deductive and
mechanical.4 Steven Smith describes formalism as “unduly rigid or
impervious to experience or new information.”5 To Richard Pos-

1

Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 608
(1908); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50
HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1936) (“If our appraisals are mechanical and superficial,
the law which they generate will likewise be mechanical and superficial, to become at last but a dry and sterile formalism.”).
2
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 129 (3d ed. 2012) (“The vice known
to legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists in an attitude to verbally
formulated rules which both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for such
choice, once the general rule has been laid down.”).
3
See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741,
756 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning] (“Often reasoning
by classification is indeed a sham, in the sense that some judgment of value is
being made but not disclosed.”).
4
Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 636, 638–39 (1999) [hereinafter Sunstein, Empirically] (“[F]ormalism is
an attempt to make the law both autonomous, in the particular sense that it does
not depend on moral or political values of particular judges, and also deductive,
in the sense that judges decide cases mechanically on the basis of preexisting
law and do not exercise discretion in individual cases.”).
5
Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 428
(1990) (“‘[F]ormalism’ is . . . more commonly[] used in a second, pejorative
sense to refer to thinking that is not only structured, but that is unduly rigid or
impervious to experience or new information.”); see also Daniel Farber, The
Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 92–93 (1995) [hereinafter
Farber, Ages] (“Among its other flaws, formalism sought to hold the law captive
to the past, in the interest of order, logic, and stability . . . .”); James G. Wilson,
The Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REV. 431, 431 (1985) (“Many modern
legal scholars have performed Gilmore’s skeptical function well, condemning or
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ner, it is an “unworkable ideal.”6 According to Fred Schauer,
“formalist” has essentially become an insult: “Few judges or
scholars would describe themselves as formalists, for a congratulatory use of the word ‘formal’ seems almost a linguistic error.”7 As
Ernest Weinrib explains, “[f]ormalism is like a heresy driven underground, whose tenets must be surmised from the derogatory
comments of its detractors.”8 Many leading scholars simply treat
formalism as a synonym for any combination of intellectual
tendencies considered shameful in lawyers.9
Not all uses of formalism are so negative, though. Justice Antonin Scalia, widely acknowledged as the scion of modern formalism,10 embraced formalism as a label: “Of all the criticisms leveled
against textualism, the most mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’ The
answer to that is, of course it’s formalistic!”11 Scalia’s formalism is

reluctantly accepting formalism as an antiquated concept implying rigidity, immutability, conservatism, and even naiveté.”).
6
Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1653, 1656, 1666 (1990).
7
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter
Schauer, Formalism].
8
Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of the
Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 950 (1988).
9
See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 923 (2003) (describing a tendency among law professors to describe judicial blunders as a result of acting “‘woodenly,’ ‘mechanically,’ or ‘formalistically,’ with insufficient attention to history, policy, and nuance”).
10
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997) (“In contemporary debates,
perhaps the most prominent formalist is Justice Antonin Scalia . . . .”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 530
(1997) (book review) (“We might even say that Justice Scalia is the clearest and
most self-conscious expositor of democratic formalism in the long history of
American law.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern
v. Marshall, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 205 [hereinafter Chemerinsky, Foundation].
11
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts] (emphasis omitted).
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commonly associated with textualism12 or originalism13 (or both14),
but Scalia was virtually alone in taking up the mantel of formalism.15 For many, Scalia’s formalism was cause for derision,16 and
12
See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE
L.J. 1750, 1762 (2010) [hereinafter Gluck, States as Laboratories] (describing a
“textualist approach” as being “associated most closely with Justice Scalia’s
legisprudence”); Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (“Formalism . . .
entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that
excludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law.”); see also Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 511–12 (describing a formalistic opinion as hiding its
choice behind “linguistic inexorability”).
13
Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 205 (“Formalism is inherent
to the originalism of conservative Justices like Scalia and Thomas who believe
that the meaning of a constitutional provision is fixed when it is adopted and
changeable only by constitutional amendment.”).
14
Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 355 (2016) (“[F]ormalism tends to be associated with both textualist and originalist theories of constitutional interpretation . . . .”); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 859 (1990) (“[F]ormalism is inextricably tied to
both textualism and originalism . . . .”); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits
of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11 (1998) (grouping together
“[t]extualism, originalism, and other brands of formalism”); Farber, Ages, supra
note 5, at 91 (“Formalists believe that certainty, stability, and logic are the primary values to be sought . . . . To implement these values, they embrace formalist methods, such as textualism as a system for interpreting statutes, adherence to
established doctrine in common-law cases, and originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation.”).
15
But not completely. See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of “Signing and Not-Enforcing,” 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 113, 114
(2007) (claiming to apply an “originalist-formalist conception of law”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False Necessity and
American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2493–94 (2014) (book review) (arguing for a “neoformalist” approach to legal interpretation). Similarly,
Frank Easterbrook favorably describes textualism as “mechanical” despite the
pejorative sense in which Pound used the term. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Text,
History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
61, 67 (1994) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation] (arguing that
the answer to many difficult questions facing judges can be answered by a “relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of interpretation”); Pound, supra note
1, at 607.
16
David M. Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1791, 1796 (1998) (attempting to demonstrate “the rigid, unconvincing character
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even Justice Scalia occasionally fell into the pejorative use of the
term.17
Mostly, though, modern treatment of formalism results in confusion: one set of modern “antiformalists”18 attacking one version
of formalism and modern originalists, along with other selfdescribed “neoformalists,”19 defending another. In some areas of
law, like separation of powers, formalism (juxtaposed with functionalism) plays a central role.20 But even in an area like separation
of powers, there is confusion over what role formalism plays.21
This Article seeks to clear the confusion22 about a concept so
widely debated in legal discourse. Rather than follow the extreme
positions taken by either the anti- or neo-formalists, I propose an
understanding of modern formalism for what it is: a commitment to
form in legal thinking.

of [Justice Scalia’s] formalistic interpretive methodology”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 416 (1991) (“I am not sure that Justice Scalia’s formalist vision
will make much headway in the Court.”) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding].
17
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding
a “formalistic distinction” that ignores practical difference between concurrent
and consecutive sentences).
18
Cf. Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (grouping various approaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”).
19
See Solum, supra note 15, at 2494.
20
See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 488, 526 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency]; John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 1958–61 (2011); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism
and Functionalism in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1527–28 (2015).
21
Compare M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of
Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (2000) (“For the formalist, questions of
horizontal governmental structure are to be resolved by reference to a fixed set
of rules and not by reference to some purpose of those rules.”) with Richard H.
Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law,
2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2 (describing “institutional formalism” as “formalism
[that] consists of treating the governmental institution involved as more or less a
formal black box”).
22
See Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define
the term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.”).
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Formalism is not a blank slate, though. The twentieth century
saw two distinct battles over formalism, and much of our current
understanding of formalism is shaped by the ways formalism was
enlisted on both sides of those battles.23 Consequently, understanding modern formalism requires one to distinguish it from other ideas that merged into formalism in the course of those two conflicts:
the early twentieth century realist rebellion against the classical,
Langdellian legal orthodoxy and the late twentieth century debates
over interpretation, especially constitutional interpretation.24
Once we separate formalism from the roles it has been assigned
in these twentieth century conflicts, we can better identify its characteristics and implications. That inquiry reveals how formalism
unites almost all approaches to legal interpretation. We’re all formalists in that we all believe form is relevant to understanding law,
even if there is disagreement about how form is relevant to understanding law.25 Although formalism is often painted as the rigid
application of rules,26 it need not be so. A commitment to form can
be rigid or flexible in the same way other methodological commitments can be held to different degrees.27
Far from inflexible and rigid thinking that avoids nuance, formalism provides a unique perspective on law and the value of legal
23

See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE:
THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 1–3 (2010) (providing an overview of formalism-realism debate in American legal thought).
24
See id. I argue below that the picture of formalism applied by realists was
a caricature, but it is also easy to over-state the degree to which the realist
movement was solely a rebellion against formalism. See NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 10 (1995) (describing simple characterization of a realist rebellion against formalism as a “myth”). The views of the
realists and the formalists were far more complex than either simple label suggests. Id.
25
Cf. Harvard Law School, The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE, at 8:30 (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (in which Justice Kagan
states, “I think we’re all textualists now”).
26
See Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91.
27
See id. (“[T]houghtful formalists admit that on occasion the formalist
methods must be tempered in order to keep the legal system from becoming
unbearably rigid and closed to current social values.”); Solum, supra note 15, at
2489–91 (comparing “absolute formalists” with “perfect realists”).
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rules. Law works by categorizing behavior, and it is the form, not
the substance, of legal rules that drives that categorization.28 Those
categories affect outcomes,29 but even when determining outcomes
is hard (when the substance of the law is uncertain), form guides
by setting the terms of the debate. For instance, equality is a major
subject of debate in U.S. constitutional law, but only because the
Equal Protection Clause requires “equal protection of the laws”30
instead of a different formulation, like “fair” or “reasonable”
treatment. By adopting rules of a particular form, rule makers also
signal how much discretion is being devolved on adjudicators,
providing important information about the allocation of responsibility in the legal system.31
In addition to providing the means to discuss the substance of
law, the form of legal rules communicates information about how
society views particular behavior—different forms of legal prohibition or sanction express society’s views on the nature of particular conduct.32 For instance, if society’s goal is to reduce traffic fatalities, choosing to criminalize speeding carries a different meaning (by altering the meaning of the underlying conduct) than other
ways to reduce fatalities, like offering subsidized traffic safety
classes or requiring that all cars have airbags installed. It is formalism that separates law from other systems of social control, and it
is only formalism that can account for the ways that the law’s form
guides and controls the way we think about legal rules.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines formalism as
a commitment to form in legal thinking and describes the role of
formalism as central to theories of rule-based decision-making33
before defending this definition from the misperceptions generated
by a hundred years of attacks on formalism. After discussing the
realist and formalist debates of the early twentieth century, I consider usage of the term in the late twentieth century, which (follow28

See infra Part III.A.1.
See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 539–40.
30
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31
See FREDRICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 158 (1991).
32
See infra Part III.B.
33
See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 548. See generally SCHAUER,
supra note 31, at 10–12.
29
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ing the realist tradition) is mostly negative and largely unhelpful
for understanding what separates formalism from other approaches
to law. Although frequently equated with several legal methodologies—textualism, originalism, and the rigid application of rules—
formalism is a component of a variety of methodologies rather than
a methodology in its own right.
Leaving the battles of the twentieth century behind, Part II carries forward this understanding of formalism to describe how it is a
distinct component of different interpretive methodologies. I then
consider how formalism operates in two areas of the law—
procedure and constitutional separation of powers—that demonstrate the use of this richer understanding of formalism.
Finally, Part III reconsiders the role that formalism should play
in legal thinking. Form is not only relevant to outcomes. It is the
form of rules that determines the language we use to think about
the law; the same rule expressed in different forms can have very
different meanings to those who apply, and are subject, to the rule.
So understood, formalism has major implications for the scholarship exploring the power of law to affect behavior not only through
sanctions but also through the social expression conveyed by those
sanctions: the expressive function of the law.34 It is only by considering the forms of law—as distinct from the underlying rules
that form represents—that we can appreciate all of the ways that
form affects how we talk and think about law.

34
See generally RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW
1–9, 11–13 (2015); Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1540 (2000);
Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400
(1965); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions
Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 592 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24 (1996) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Expressive Function].
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I.
CONSTRUCTING FORMALISM
Although the term “formalism” is a common one, there is no
authoritative definition of formalism in law.35 Formalism describes
a practice and a particular approach to understanding law that is
implicit in many legal methodologies. Unfortunately, opponents of
formalism (or, rather, opponents of specific methodologies associated with formalism) have taken to using it as an epithet to describe virtually anything they dislike in legal thinking.36 Consequently, in addition to providing an affirmative definition of formalism, it is necessary to disentangle formalism from what have
become rhetorical ad hominem uses (“formalistic” or “formulaic”)
leveled during scholarly and judicial battles over various legal
methodologies. Liberating our attention to formalism from the
quarrels over specific formalist methodologies frees us to engage
formalism on its own terms.
Once we do so, even a brief consideration of formalism reveals
that it is both nuanced and pervasive throughout the legal system.
Although formalism represents a commitment to rules, it is no
more or less rigid than other interpretive practices, and despite reports of its demise, formalism not only persists, it continues to
dominate legal thinking, dwarfing virtually any other approach to
law.37
A.
Pure Formalism
In its most basic sense, formalism is a commitment to form in
legal thinking. It reflects an approach that determines the meaning
of law by looking at its form. This might seem commonsensical or
even almost automatic. We all use the form of law—for instance,
its text, which is an attribute of form—to determine legal meaning.
That need not be the case. If law were contained in the intuitions of
philosopher kings who decided all cases that came before them, it

35

Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define the
term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.”).
36
See infra Part I.B.
37
See infra Part I.B.
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could exist without form or without regard to its form.38 Form
would be irrelevant to determining the content of the law, and consequently, form would not affect the content of the law. Modern
legal systems, however, are not predicated on the intuitions of philosopher kings. The laws exist in various forms, and formalism is
the recognition that those forms control the content of the law.
Formalism is the recognition, for instance, that the content of a
smoking prohibition changes whether it is contained in a statute, a
no-smoking sign posted by a restaurant, or a parental reprimand.
Formalism is reflected in the concern that a jury verdict has a different meaning than a judge’s finding39 or that the forms of government adopted by the Constitution—the division of executive,
legislative, and judicial branches—must be respected, even if they
cannot be justified in a particular case.40 Formalism is everywhere
in law and legal argumentation. When John Marshall argued that
the Necessary and Proper Clause41 was an extension of congressional power rather than a limitation because it was located in the
power-conferring parts of the Constitution,42 he was making an
argument based on form. Finally, formalism is the means we use to
figure out what is and what is not law; it tells us that congressional
resolutions complying with bicameralism and presentment have a
different legal meaning than those issued by one house or a committee and that the President’s statements have different legal ef-

38

See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 170—71 (B. Jowett trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 3d ed. 1925) (c. 375 B.C.E.) (introducing the concept of “philosopher kings”).
39
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40
See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 405 (“Under formalist ideology, the Court’s role in statutory interpretation is not to facilitate the dominant
political coalition’s evolving preferences, but to protect the formal structures of
our democracy.”).
41
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
42
M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) (“The clause
is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those
powers.”). Indeed, Marshall provided this as the “1st” reason for interpreting the
clause as an expansion rather than a restriction of congressional power, ahead
even the text of the clause itself, which he listed “2d.” Id. at 419–20.
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fect when they appear in the Federal Register than when they appear on Twitter.43
Robert Summers advanced perhaps the purest understanding of
this sense of formalism: a consideration of form in the legal system.44 Summers’s work was an attempt to identify the variety of
forms existing in the legal system and how law’s form is distinct
from its substance.45 Rather than an attempt to describe the role
form plays in modern debates about the meaning of law, Summers
avoided those modern debates, allowing himself to see the role of
form in law more clearly.46 Formalism is everywhere in law, and
law’s form tells us more about whether a particular rule applies to
our conduct than does the substance of the rule itself. I don’t have
to know what the speed limit is in order to know that I must comply with it. All I need to know is that the limit follows the forms
(in terms of origin, process, and (usually) publication on a sign I
can read) that qualifies it as enforceable law.
1. THE FORM OF FORMALISM
If formalism is commitment to form, we need a working understanding of form. “Form,” as Ernest Weinrib explains,
is the ensemble of characteristics that constitute the
matter in question as a unity identical to that of other matters of the same kind and distinguishable
from matters of a different kind. Form is not separate from content but is the ensemble of characteris43

See Federal Register Act of 1935, 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (requiring all presidential proclamations and orders with general legal effect to be published in
Federal Register).
44
See generally Robert S. Summers, The Formal Character of Law, 51
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 242, 242–45 (1992) (explaining that formality is a fundamental
feature of law).
45
Id. at 242 (“I define a ‘formal’ feature of law as one that is in some way
independent of the substantive content of the law.”).
46
Id. at 245 (“I must stress that I will not report the results of any legal
research nor will I reveal any discoveries of fact about legal phenomena . . . . [Rather,] I will re-order, reconceptuali[ze], and introduce a nomenclature for much that is already very familiar. This will sharpen our perception of
formal features in diverse legal phenomena.”).
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tics that marks the content as determinate, and
therefore marks the content as a content.47
Weinrib’s definition points out two important characteristics of
form: First, form is relevant to distinction—to grouping things of
like character with each other and excluding things that are dissimilar.48 Second, and more important for present purposes, form is
used to identify content.49 A necessary implication of recognizing
form as the means through which we identify content is that form
is necessary for identifying content. It is an acknowledgement that
content might have a meaning apart from its form, but that meaning cannot be understood by an observer except through attributes
of form.50 This characteristic of form is hardly unique to law; as
Weinrib explains, we can only identify a table as a table because it
exhibits characteristics (“elevation, flatness, hardness, typical function, and so on”) that mark it as a table.51 Similarly, law does not
present itself as law at a purely conceptual level but has to be confronted, considered, and manipulated through some form. Because
we are not ruled by philosopher kings who can access their intui-

47

Weinrib, supra note 8, at 958.
See id. at 959–60.
49
See id. Here, Weinrib’s approach to form diverges from that of Robert
Summers. Summers defines form as anything “independent of the substantive
content of the law.” Summers, supra note 44, at 242. That broad definition leads
Summers to identify a very wide variety of “forms,” from “the degree of completeness of a rule” to “foundational rules and other legal precepts” (somewhat
resembling Hart’s rule of recognition) to a “methodology for adherence to
common law precedent” to “administrative bodies and administrative procedures” to “some special mode of protection of basic individual rights.” Id. at
245–46. Summers’s definition is not only broad, it is negative—Summers essentially defines form as “not content.” Id. at 242. As a result, Summers’s approach
is not interested in identifying form’s role in the content of law but rather to
identify how form exists apart from the content. See id. at 246. It is not clear
how successful he was in maintaining the distinction. His last category of form,
for instance, is itself defined by the content (the protection of fundamental
rights) of a particular rule. Id. But the fact that form and substance affect each
other only underscores his larger point: that form plays an important role in our
understanding of law. See id. at 259–60.
50
See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 961.
51
Id. at 958–59.
48
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tions directly, we can only identify the content of law by observing
its form.
Recognizing the importance of form necessarily acknowledges
that the complete content of the law is inherently unknowable apart
from the form we experience; that all we can really know is the
law as represented by its form. This is so even if thought can exist
apart from language.52 Our notional philosopher kings might be
able to think without language, but we do not rely on individuals to
set and apply the law. Our law is an inherently social and therefore
inherently shared enterprise.53 That sharing has to take place in
some form decipherable to all participants in the legal system.54
Before we can play chess, we have to agree on its rules,55 and before we can do that, we have to agree on the rules for talking about
rules.56 Formalism identifies as the first rule of law that law is primarily determined by looking at its form, not by an individually
held but unshared understanding of its content.
2. FORMALISM AS RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING
The reason why formalism must have a place of privilege in
understanding law has to do with the nature of law as governance
by rule. As Fred Schauer explains, “[a]t the heart of the word ‘formalism,’ in many of its numerous uses, lies the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.”57 Schauer’s concern (and his usage
of “rule”) goes to the fundamental distinction between “rules” and
“standards.”58 “Rules” (such as a numerically defined and objec52

See id.
See id. at 64 (describing legal interpretation as “a social enterprise”).
54
See id.
55
Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 108–10 (2d ed. 1990)
(describing playing chess and other acts as “normative acts based on constitutive
rules,” which shape “new forms of behavior”).
56
See JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 48 (1969) (distinguishing between the
meaning intended by a sentence and the need for rules of grammar as a “conventional means of achieving the intention to produce” that meaning in the mind of
the listener).
57
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 510.
58
Compare id. (discussing how rules function by “screening off from a
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into
account”), with HART, supra note 2, at 124–35.
53
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tively measured speed limit) provide clear rules for deciding cases
but are not sensitive to particular circumstances (whether there was
some justification for driving so fast).59 “Standards” (such as a
negligence or recklessness standard) provide less guidance but allow for more consideration of whether the particular case falls
within the ambit of the prohibition.60 Although rules might be
based on underlying justifications—they are “instantiations” of a
justification for acting—decision according to rule requires a
choice: to pay more attention to a rule than to the underlying justifications for the rule.61 When that happens, the instantiation of the
justification effectively displaces the justification itself and the rule
governs the relevant conduct even if its justification would not.62
Even though we all know that the twenty-five mile-per-hour speed
limit on Main Street is there to promote safety, we will still break
the law if it would be safe to drive over twenty-five miles per hour
in a particular instance. The same is not true of a “reckless driving”
law. The justification (deterring reckless driving) would be relevant to deciding an individual case because guilt would depend on
whether the driving was in fact the reckless driving that the law
seeks to deter.63
But rules themselves go beyond justification to the question of
how decision-making authority is allocated in a legal system.64
Rules allow authors to constrain the discretion of adjudicators who
59

See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 510.
See HART, supra note 2, at 124–35; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 588–90 (1992); Pierre Schlag,
Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985). Schauer himself deviates from this usage by focusing not on specificity but on the degree to which
the rule or standard deviates from its underlying justification. SCHAUER, supra
note 31, at 104 n.35. He rightly points out that a standard that tracks its underlying justification might be very specific while a rule that substitutes for it might
be vague. Id.
61
See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112–13.
62
Id. at 112.
63
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-852 (1989) (“Irrespective of the maximum speeds permitted by law, any person who drives a vehicle on any highway
recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be guilty of reckless driving.”).
64
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 543; see also SCHAUER, supra note
31, at 162–66.
60
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will be applying the rule in a particular case.65 They do this, in
large part, by excluding from consideration factors (such as the
safety of driving over twenty-five miles per hour) that the adjudicator might otherwise find relevant.66 As Schauer explains, rules
provide a reason for compliance that is independent from the policies they seek to further—indeed that is the very nature of a
“rule.”67
Schauer thus justifies rules not only on their ability to generate
better outcomes, which can happen if rule-makers make systematically better decisions than adjudicators would acting alone,68 but
also on their ability to allow allocations of power among the institutions of government.69 Under Schauer’s understanding of the
value of rules, the correct way to evaluate formalism is not necessarily whether it is more deterministic or leads to better outcomes—but rather it is whether one can defend a practice in which
rule authors (legislators) allocate power to themselves and away
from adjudicators (judges) who will apply the law to particular
cases.70
In his theory of rule-based decision-making, Schauer has much
in common with Justice Scalia, whose formalism was committed to
65

See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 538; SCHAUER, supra note 31,

at 158.
66
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 544 (“Part of what formalism is
about is its inculcation of the view that sometimes it is appropriate for decisionmakers to recognize their lack of jurisdiction and to defer even when they
are convinced that their own judgment is best.”).
67
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112 (“When the existence of an instantiation
adds normative weight beyond that supplied by its underlying substantive justifications, the instantiation has the status of a rule.”).
68
Id. at 151–54.
69
See id. at 158. Summers drew a similar distinction in his discussion of
formality, distinguishing between first-level policy goals (to control behavior in
a desired way) and second-level rationales for formality (to allocate discretion
away from officials or to increase the clarity and, hence, the reliability of substantive rules of law). Summers, supra note 44, at 247–48.
70
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 214; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role
of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65
(1988) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Original Intent] (“Congress may think the costs
of rules less than the combined costs of vagueness and the risk that courts will
set off in the direction the law points without seeing the stopping point.”).
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constraining the discretion of judges.71 His defenses of textualism
and originalism were closely aligned to his defense of rules; in The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, Scalia defended both originalism
and textualism for their ability to supply the “raw material” for
rule-based decision-making.72 But Scalia’s defense of textualism
and originalism was more explicitly institutionalist than Schauer’s:
First, Schauer justifies rules both on their ability to generate better
outcomes and their ability to allocate power73 while Scalia concentrated solely on the their power-allocating function.74 Although
many of his critics considered his formalism to be grounded in
ideological conservativism,75 Scalia himself justified his formalism
(both textualism and originalism) on institutional rather than empirical or instrumental grounds.76 Second, Scalia’s justification for
formalism emphasized dangers presented not only by appliers of
rules but also by their authors.77 Scalia’s formalism sought to con71

See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1182–84 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rule of Law]; Solum, supra note
15, at 2494; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword:
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 33 (1994) (“The turn-of-the-century
formalists and their current heirs maintain that the Court has a single goal: declaring and enforcing the rule of law.”).
72
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1184 (“Just as that manner of textual exegesis facilitates the formulation of general rules, so does, in the constitutional field, adherence to a more or less originalist theory of construction. The
raw material for the general rule is readily apparent.”); see also Solum, supra
note 15, at 2494.
73
See generally SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 158–59, 229–233
74
See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176.
75
E.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Balanced Realism on Judging, 44 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1243, 1257 (2010) (“The suspicion that politics is what drives charges of
‘formalism’ is heightened when one recognizes that the jurists most often condemned as formalists were usually conservatives of some stripe . . . .”);
Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 410 (“Formalism . . . embodies a relatively antigovernmental philosophy. This may reflect the libertarian bias of
some formalists . . . .”).
76
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.
849, 862 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Originalism]; see also John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685, 688–
89 (1999) (distinguishing among various constitutional values that formalism
might reflect).
77
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176; Scalia, Common-Law Courts,
supra note 11, at 17.
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strain drafters by requiring them to exercise control in readily identifiable forms (text).78
3. RULES AND FORMS OF RULES
But rules and form are not the same thing, and there is considerable daylight between Schauer’s account of rule-based decisionmaking79 and Scalia’s formalism; “formalism,” even in common
rather than legal usage is a “strict or excessive adherence to prescribed forms”80 not “a strict or excessive adherence to rules.”81
78
See Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176; Scalia, Common-Law
Courts, supra note 11, at 17–18; Scalia, Originalism, supra note 54, at 863.
Scalia thought textualism could simultaneously require legislatures to state rules
clearly (to avoid “Nero’s trick” of posting laws high on pillars where they could
not be read) and prevent judges from substituting their own preferences in the
service of discerning unstated legislative intent. Scalia, Common-Law Courts,
supra note 11, at 17–18; see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997) (describing limits that textualism
imposes on Congress).
79
Various modern anti-formalist critiques of formalism, from modern realism, to critical legal studies, to attitudinal theories of judicial decision-making
share that critical view of formalism as predicated on law as an autonomous
system. Solum, supra note 15, at 2465–66. If formalism represents decision by
rule, then modern formalism, like conceptual formalism, is predicated on the
existence of law as an autonomous system. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 438 (1989) (“This is, at
bottom, a formalist position—formalist because it sees the process as entirely
autonomous and free from value-laden inquiries.”). These critiques of formalism
that invalidly depend on the autonomy of law are, like criticisms of determinacy,
leveled not at formalism itself but rather at the existence of a settled meaning of
law regardless of one’s method for determining that meaning. Thus, my answer
to the criticism from autonomy is the same as my answer to the criticism from
determinism: it represents a confusion between conceptualist orthodoxy and
modern formalism, which is a method for determining the meaning of law but
does not itself posit that law has a single, unsettled meaning. Indeed, modern
formalism is predicated on exactly the opposite supposition, as evidenced by the
formalist rejection of intentionalism discussed immediately below.
80
Frederick Schauer, Formalism: Legal, Constitutional, Judicial, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 428 (Keith E. Whittington et al.
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK] (emphasis added) (quoting 6 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 83 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed.,
1989)).
81
Thus, I would distinguish formalism itself from so-called “rule formalism,” which is the term frequently used to describe rule-based approaches like
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Form certainly mattered to Justice Scalia, who justified textualism
and originalism based on a commitment to shifting power from
judges toward legislatures but rejected attempts to determine the
intent of the legislatures he was attempting to empower: Scalia’s
originalism was textual, and he attacked so-called “intentionalism”
(even intentionalism as to the meaning of rules) as threatening to
democracy because it ignores the need for legislative will to appear
in an objectively expressed form.82 Similar concerns underlie the
formalism of Frank Easterbrook, who attacks legislative intent (if
such a thing could even exist) as irrelevant because the nature of
the legislative process (aconceptual as it is) requires agreement,
which arrives not in the form of an understood intent but rather as
a text.83
Both textualism and originalism are methodologies predicated
on analysis of law according to its form. Form itself matters to textualists and originalists because, in their view (given the available
alternatives), text (in either its plain or original meaning) is the
only form that can serve the dual purpose of adequately constraining both legislators and the judges who will be applying the law in
particular cases.84
Schauer’s. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic
Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2157 n.97 (1999) (describing a rule-based
approach as “rule formalism”); cf. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Combination of
Formalism and Realism 1 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of L. Working Paper,
Paper No. 17-03-01, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2929038 [hereinafter Tamanaha, Combination] (distinguishing types of formalism between “conceptual formalism” and “rule formalism”). My point is that
“rule formalism” doesn’t adequately capture modern formalist approaches because it does not depend on form.
82
Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 17 (arguing that it is
wrong “to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant,
rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated”).
83
Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 70, at 63 (“[T]the original intent
approach to legislation ignores the fact that laws are born of compromise. Different designs pull in different directions.”). That decidedly formalist sentiment
was shared by the realist Oliver Wendell Holmes, who similarly rejected legislative intent as a guide to statutory interpretation. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899).
84
See, e.g., Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176–77; Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 17–18.
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In many ways, though, formalism’s connection to textualism
and originalism is part of the problem. As described below, formalism is not synonymous with either textualism or originalism, but
much of the modern confusion over the meaning of formalism is
the result of the term’s use by both sides in debates over the merits
of textualism and originalism.85 Part of understanding formalism is
to separate it from those debates without denying its connection to
both methodologies.
4. RULES, FORMS, AND LEGAL MEANING
Formalism goes beyond the ability to identify the law; it informs our understanding of the substance of the law. It is possible
for rules to be understood in a variety of forms. Thus, to borrow
Hart’s example (expanded upon by Schauer), suppose a “rule”
against wearing hats in church.86 That rule may appear to different
people in different forms. One person may simply observe that
others are removing their hats on entering the church and do so
themself so as not to stand out. Another may have studied the particular religion and know that the religion considers it disrespectful
to hide one’s head from God (while knowing that other religions
consider it disrespectful not to). A third person, a child coming in
from a baseball game, may simply be told by an adult to remove
their hat when coming into the church without further explanation.
All three individuals experience the hat-removal rule as a “rule” in
Schauer’s terms in that the instantiation of the rule displaces its
underlying justification87—the person removes their hat because of
the rule even if they do not believe wearing a hat is in fact disrespectful to God.
If a rule can be expressed in many forms, the question is
whether the form of the rule matters apart from the content of the
rule—whether the form of the rule has significance independent
from the content of the rule it expresses. The answer to that question seems self-evidently “yes.” The hat doffer who seeks to avoid
embarrassment, the religious scholar, and the admonished child all
understand very different rules by virtue of the way they came to
85
86
87

See infra Part I.B.3.
HART, supra note 2, at 124–26; SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 69–72.
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 112.
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learn the content of the rule—by the form of the rule they experienced.88 The form in which a rule is expressed might affect how
closely people conform their behavior to the rule (I might be more
(or less) likely to slow down based on a speed limit sign than based
on a suggestion from a billboard), but the form of a rule might carry meaning beyond its ability to generate compliance; it might send
a message about the social meaning of conduct by virtue of how it
subjects that conduct to law.89
Understanding “formalism” as an approach to law that considers form might seem obvious, but the meaning of “formalism” has
been clouded by its use on both sides of a series of arguments
about law.90 In order to clear those clouds, it is necessary to revisit
the various ways formalism was used in the twentieth century before we can free formalism to fulfill its potential in the twenty-first
century.
B.
Twentieth Century Formalism
In many ways, the battle over formalism was the defining legal
controversy of the twentieth century.91 The early twentieth century
saw the rise of realism, which was a direct assault on the formal88

From this perspective, Schauer’s rule-based decision-making seems not
particularly formalist, since rules might be applied in a more or less rule-like
fashion without regard to their particular form, and Schauer came to rely less on
formalism as his theory of rules developed. Although Schauer launched his theory of rule-based decision-making as a defense of formalism, the connection to
formalism is more attenuated in Schauer’s later work on rule-based decisionmaking. In Formalism itself, Schauer first defined his approach as “presumptive
formalism” before switching the label at the end of the paper to “presumptive
positivism.” See Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 546, 548. In the later
Playing by the Rules, Schauer completed the move he began in Formalism,
shifting his emphasis away from formalism and toward a positivist approach to
law. Compare id. at 546 with SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 196 (featuring term
“presumptive positivism”).
89
See infra Part III.
90
See TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3 (describing history of academic
debates between formalists and realists).
91
See Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics
of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197 (2009) (“Of all the great disputes that
have marked American law, formalism vs. realism might well be among the
most pervasive and significant.”).
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ism exhibited by the Langdellian orthodoxy that had preceded it,
and many developments in law over this period could be seen as a
rejection of formalist approaches.92 Any number of developments,
from the rejection of the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson93 to the practical approach to education that the Court
took in Brown v. Board of Education,94 could be described as the
triumph of realism over formalism. In the late twentieth century,
formalism became embroiled in a second battle, this time over the
rise of textualism95 and originalism96 as the dominant methodologies of legal interpretation. I will address this historical divide between early and late twentieth century battles over formalism, describing first the realist critique of the orthodoxy before discussing
the modern understanding of formalism, an understanding held
largely by critics, many of whom are methodologically united only
in their criticism of formalism (a group I refer to collectively as
“anti-formalists”97). To find formalism, we must consider formalism for what it is, not the most contentious ways in which it is
used.
1. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE “CLASSICAL
ORTHODOXY” AND THE REALIST RESPONSE
In American law, the first half of the twentieth century was
marked by the rise of legal realism, and with it the demise of its
primary intellectual rival: so-called “legal formalism.”98 But label92

TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 2.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
94
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
95
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1995) (“[C]onsistent with its interest in textualism as
its dominant interpretive methodology, the current Court emphasizes clear
statement rules much more than presumptions.”).
96
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 245 (1995) (“The
dominant rhetoric of judges . . . is originalist, for originalism is the legal profession’s orthodox mode of justification.”).
97
Cf. Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639 (grouping various approaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”).
98
See generally TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3; Schlag, supra note 91,
at 201–04; cf. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 35–39
(1960) (distinguishing between the “formal” style and its predecessor, the
93
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ing the opposite of realism as “formalism” is itself largely a modern habit;99 contemporary uses of “formalism” or “formalist” were
less frequent.100 The focus of the realist criticism was not “formalism” per se but rather a concept of law as complete, logically ordered, and objectively determinable;101 a conception of the completeness of law that has been alternatively (and occasionally collectively) associated with the classical positivism of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin;102 and “analytical jurisprudence”103—what
Thomas Grey labeled the “classical orthodoxy”: a conception of
law inseparably identified with Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell.104 Although formalism has, in modern times, been generally
identified with this complete conception of law,105 formalism was
merely one component of it; Langdell’s orthodoxy was much bigger than “formalism.”106 As Grey points out, Langdell’s universal“grand” style); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 447 n.12 (1930).
99
E.g., Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1138, 1145–46 (1999) (book review) [hereinafter Leiter, Positivism] (“[W]e
may characterize formalism as the descriptive theory of adjudication according
to which (1) the law is rationally determinate, and (2) judging is mechanical. It
follows, moreover, from (1), that (3) legal reasoning is autonomous, since the
class of legal reasons suffices to justify a unique outcome; no recourse to nonlegal reasons is demanded or required.”).
100
See, e.g., Pound, supra note 1, at 607–08 (attacking formalistic ideas as
“mechanical jurisprudence” without using term formalism or formalist).
101
Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608–09
(1999) [hereinafter Pildes, Forms of Formalism] (“To the classical formalists,
law meant more: it meant a scientific system of rules and institutions that were
complete in that the system made right answers available in all cases; formal in
that right answers could be derived from the autonomous, logical working out of
the system; conceptually ordered in that ground-level rules could all be derived
from a few fundamental principles; and socially acceptable in that the legal
system generated normative allegiance.”).
102
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
23, 30–32 (1998).
103
Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054,
2068–72 (1995).
104
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1983).
105
See, e.g., Pildes, Forms of Formalism, supra note 101, at 608–09; Leiter,
Positivism, supra note 99, at 1145–46.
106
See Grey, supra note 104, at 6.
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ist picture of law encompassed not only formalism but other essential components: comprehensiveness, completeness, conceptual
order, and acceptability.107
With Grey’s more careful parsing of the classical orthodoxy,
this “formalism” takes on a more specific meaning: a method for
describing the connection between a principle and its application in
an objective and logical fashion—a procedural approach to deriving meaning.108 Adherents to the classical orthodoxy borrowed
concepts like formality from mathematical reasoning, likening law
to geometry, in which principles and formal reasoning were combined with physical observation to discover objective truth.109
Formalism was a distinct part of the orthodoxy and could exist in a
system that lacked other attributes of the classical orthodoxy, such
as completeness or autonomy110 (Richard Posner, for instance, frequently employs elements of formal reasoning111 while denying
that law is autonomous112). Formalism was, therefore, merely one
107

Id.
Id. at 8 (“A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are dictated by demonstrative (rationally compelling) reasoning.”).
109
See id. at 19.
110
Cf. Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1150–51 (describing formalism as
a theory of adjudication existing independently from any particular theory about
nature or source of law).
111
See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589,
593 (7th Cir. 1986) ( writing for majority, Judge Posner explained that a preliminary injunction could only be granted if “P x Hp > (1 – P) x Hd”).
112
See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1987); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 425 (“Posner’s efforts to make law more scientific and his wellknown attempts to resolve a multitude of legal problems and to unify numerous
and diverse areas of law within the regime of law and economics are arguably
instances—indeed, extreme instances—of formalist thinking.” (footnotes omitted)); David A. Strauss, The Anti-Formalist, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1885, 1886
(2007) (“Some might say that Posner’s economic analysis of legal issues does
sometimes succumb to the ‘lure of scientific order,’ simplifying problems excessively so that they can be analyzed with the tools of economics. However true
that may be, Posner, as a judge, is one of the great anti-formalists of our time.”).
Approaches like Posner’s have led some to conflate social-science driven approaches with textualism, labeling both as different kinds of “formalism” when
the two could not be more distinct. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, A
Tale of Two Formalisms, 106 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript
at 4) (electronic copy available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3553508) (“[Law and
108
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part of the classical orthodoxy, which encompassed other equally
(if not more) contestable claims about law, such as its coherence
and autonomy.113
But the converse was not true; the Langdellian vision was not
constructed out of methods or concepts that could be applied in
other areas.114 The orthodoxy was specific to the common law.115
The formalism (as in the procedural approach to deriving meaning)
of the model was itself dependent on the existence of the conceptual ordering of a system like that of the common law.116 Followers
of the classical orthodoxy did not argue that statutes could be procedurally interpreted using formalism; the components of the orthodoxy were specific to inquiry into the common law and did not
exist outside of it.117
Formalism in the sense of objective reasoning may have been
part of Langdell’s admittedly problematic vision of law, but it was
a relatively minor component along with others, most especially
conceptualism: the idea that the law applicable in a particular case
could be derived from fundamental principles118 (a claim that itself
implied the autonomy of law since being able to determine the law
from a few principles meant that there was no need for recourse to
information other than those principles119). When Hart criticized
formalism, he did so by attacking conceptualism in both label and
substance:
When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront
the issues at stake and can then settle the question
by choosing between the competing interests in the
economics] is economic formalism. [Originalism and textualism] is legal formalism.”).
113
See Grey, supra note 104, at 6.
114
See generally id. at 2, 5–6.
115
See id. at 19.
116
See id. at 8–9; 40–41.
117
Id. at 34.
118
Id. at 8.
119
Weinrib, supra note 8, at 951–52. Weinrib posits that conceptualist formalism sought to reject the distinction between concept and form exhibited by
most concepts (such as tables) by insisting that the tools for understanding law
must come from law itself—in other words, “the internal intelligibility of law.”
Id. at 961–62.
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way which best satisfies us . . . . The vice known to
legal theory as formalism or conceptualism consists
in an attitude to verbally formulated rules which
both seeks to disguise and to minimize the need for
such choice, once the general rule has been laid
down.120
The enterprise of the realists, led by Pound, Karl Llewellyn,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes, was to dismantle the classical orthodoxy, which they found theoretically unsatisfactory and practically
unworkable.121 When one considers the combination of claims upon which the classical orthodoxy depended, its eventual demise
seems almost inevitable. It is of course impossible to envision a
comprehensive (which is to say gapless), complete (and hence autonomous), objectively logical, and socially acceptable legal system in practice; too many legal questions are contested to permit
anyone to seriously believe that such a system exists. The realist
enterprise was negative—the classical orthodoxy was the “indispensable foil, the parental dogma that shapes the heretical growth
of a rebellious offspring.”122 The strict requirements of conceptualism made the realist’s deconstructive enterprise an easy one, since
establishing any gaps or inconsistency would undermine the absolute claim upon which such a system must rest.123 Attacking formality itself was even easier, since what is objectively determinable to one is not necessarily objectively determinable to another;
Langdell himself was convinced that the fundamental principles of
contract law could be objectively applied to conclude that acceptance of an offer be effective only on receipt of the acceptance

120

HART, supra note 2, at 129.
See Grey, supra note 104, at 49.
122
Id. at 3; Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV.
465, 476 (1988) (“Realism was a reaction against classical legal thought . . . .”).
123
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L. REV. 652,
653–54 (1873). See generally DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 23 (1996)
(“The plausibility of the formalist enterprise depends upon the success of its
metaphysical claims, specifically that law has a conceptual and normative structure independent of the play of external, usually political, interests.”).
121
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by the offeror,124 and yet courts have largely reached a different
conclusion.125
Of course, many of these points of criticism were strawmen—
it’s not clear that anyone ever held the most contentious of these
views.126 The orthodoxy itself was an aspirational, not a descriptive, claim.127 The criticism from determinacy was particularly
misplaced, since the requirements of conceptualism were applicable not to the outcomes of particular cases but rather to the principles themselves; inconsistent outcomes in specific cases weren’t
really a demonstration of the failure of the system at all.128 Whether the criticism from determinacy was a fair one or not, it is clear
that realism won, or at least that the orthodoxy lost. There are no
serious adherents to Langdellian conceptualist formalism today.129
2. FORMALISM AND LOCHNERISM
As Fred Schauer has pointed out, the Oxford English Dictionary defines “formalism” as “strict or excessive adherence to prescribed forms,”130 and even today the term is frequently used to
describe an excessive degree of rigidity,131 which is the sense in
124

See Grey, supra note 104, at 3–4.
See, e.g., Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681–82 (K.B. 1818).
126
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Mounting Evidence Against the “Formalist
Age,” 92 TEX. L. REV. 1667, 1679–83 (2014) [hereinafter Tamanaha, Formalist
Age] (discussing problems with Pound’s account of formalism and resulting
confusion).
127
Grey, supra note 104, at 13.
128
Weinrib, supra note 8, at 1009.
129
See Smith, supra note 5, at 427 (“Does anyone today contend that law is
‘a body of immutable principles’?” (quoting Posner, supra note 6, at 1656)).
Even those who ascribe to a conceptualist formalism have a far more limited
view of the power of conceptualism. See ALLAN BEEVER, FORGOTTEN JUSTICE
243–44 (2013).
130
Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428 (emphasis added)
(quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83).
131
E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707,
712 (1991) (describing “rigid, rule-like deductivism associated with formalism”); Golove, supra note 16, at 1796 (describing the “the rigid, unconvincing
character of [Justice Scalia’s] formalistic interpretive methodology”); Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal Formalism of
the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 345 (2014) (describing formal125
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which Scalia himself invoked it as a term of opprobrium in his dissent in Oregon v. Ice.132
The attack on formalism as rigidity is particularly unfair, since
the existence of a commitment and the degree of that commitment
are distinct. One could have a rigid commitment to formalism or a
flexible one, in the same way one could be a committed pragmatist
(for instance, by devaluing a statute’s text if it works a result inconsistent with received intent or socially optimal outcomes) or a
flexible one (by using practical considerations only in cases of textual ambiguity).133 The view of formalism as rigidity is held exclusively by its critics134 (I have found no one brave enough to argue
that one should apply the law with excessive rigidity), and so it
would be easy to ignore the equation of formalism with rigidity as
no more than an attempt to overstate the claims of formalism in
order to make them easier to attack—much like the realist critique
of Langdellian determinism135—but for the widespread popularity
of this view.136 Although this view is held in modern times, it deserves treatment as part of the early twentieth century battles over
formalism because of its close association with the supremely unpopular decision in Lochner v. New York.137
ism as “strict adherence to a rigid rule, coupled with a refusal to consider the
merit of a possible exception”); cf. Summers, supra note 44, at 244 (“Americans
frequently threw the baby—formality, out with the bath water—excessive formality.”).
132
See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 173–78 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
infra note 198.
133
Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 559 (1992) [hereinafter Farber,
Inevitability]; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 640 (“The real question is
‘what degree of formalism?’ rather than ‘formalist or not?’”).
134
See, e.g., supra note 129.
135
See Grey, supra note 104, at 49; Tamanaha, Formalist Age, supra note
126, at 1679–83.
136
See supra note 129.
137
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see J.M. Balkin, Some Realism about Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990
DUKE L.J. 375, 400 (discussing what “a Lochner-era formalist might argue”);
Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 511 (“Few decisions are charged with
formalism as often as Lochner v. New York.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest
Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV.
941, 972 (1999) (“The prevailing wisdom today is that Lochner-era jurispru-
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Attempting to rescue formalism from its cursed association
with Lochner, Schauer himself has explained that Lochner is actually “false formalism” in the sense that the Court’s formalistic
treatment of the “liberty” question in the case was actually a deceptive use of formalism; the Court in Lochner hid the true, contingent basis for the decision in a falsely deterministic one.138 I
would make that claim in even stronger terms: Lochner was not
“false formalism” because it was not formalist at all.
Any number of cases could be pointed to as examples of judges
deciding cases on highly controversial grounds while attributing
the outcome to another seemingly more deterministic one. As I
have written elsewhere, Justice Brennan employed exactly that
approach in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno139—a case in which he intended to apply a fundamental rights
approach but turned to the false objectivity of rationality when that
strategy failed.140 No one would consider Moreno to be a formalist
application of the rational basis test, even if it was a falsely deterministic one, and I think the same is true of Lochner. Lochner may
be deceptively deterministic, but it is a mistake to label all deceptively deterministic cases “formalist” or “formalistic.”141
My point of disagreement with Schauer’s characterization of
Lochner comes with his claim that the choice made by the Court

dence was rigidly formalistic.”); see also David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New
York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1504, n.228 (2005)
(collecting citations to Lochner as formalist).
138
Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428–29.
139
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
140
Thomas B. Nachbar, Rational Basis “Plus”, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 449,
450–51 (2017).
141
Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 429–30; cf. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defensor Fidei: The Travails of a Post-Realist Formalist, 47 FLA.
L. REV. 815, 821 n. 41 (1995) (“Perhaps, however, it is unfair to keep bringing
up Lochner to challenge the formalist account of legal reasoning. Justice Peckham’s error was not that he was a formalist; it was that he was formalistic.”).
Lidsky, too, was attempting to rescue formalism from the tarred brush of Lochner, but it’s not clear that the “ic” of “formalistic” can do that much work. Dictionaries tend to indiscriminately define both “formalistic” and “formalist” an
adjectival forms of “formalism.” See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra
note 80, at 83 (defining these terms).
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was “masked by the language of linguistic inexorability,”142 by
which he suggests a false textualism.143 That view has a solid pedigree; Holmes’s famous dissent in Lochner accuses it of being formalist through his citation to the compass of “liberty”144 (the textual basis of Peckham’s opinion145). But a textual connection does
not formalism make—if it did, then any equal protection case striking a law as inconsistent with “equal protection of the laws” would
also deserve to be called formalist.146
As it happens, Lochner was not a particularly textualist decision. Although ostensibly protecting the “liberty” of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lochner decision
did not hold that the restraint at issue (a working hours limitation)
was categorically unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with
a fixed understanding of the word “liberty” but rather that the particular regulation at issue (one applied only to bakers) was “unrea-

142

Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 512.
Schauer’s criticism of Lochner’s “linguistic inexorability” raises a question about which form of formalism he is applying. Textualism is more a product of modern understandings of formalism than the conceptualist formalism
attributed to Langdell, see supra Part I.A.3., although both are equally open to
charges of (false) determinacy.
144
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I
think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion.”); see, e.g., Sunstein,
On Analogical Reasoning, supra note 3, at 756 (“Consider, for example, the
view that the liberty to contract is necessarily, and purely as a matter of semantics, part of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause.” (citing Lochner,
198 U.S. at 53)).
145
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (“The general right to make a contract in relation
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”).
146
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. If anything, it is Holmes, not Peckham,
who was the better formalist in 1905. Holmes’s condemnation of the majority’s
reliance on “an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain” and “Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics” is a claim that the Court was
importing non-legal materials into its consideration of a legal question, which
would have been a violation of Langdellian conceptualist formalism. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See generally DUXBURY, supra note
24, at 45-46 (describing broader implications of Holmes’s Lochner dissent for
use of outside sources).
143
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sonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary.”147 The discussion of “liberty”
in Justice Peckham’s decision is literally conditional: “Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable conditions as may be
imposed by the governing power of the State in the exercise of
those powers, and with such conditions the Fourteenth Amendment
was not designed to interfere,”148 and nowhere does Peckham suggest that separating unreasonable conditions from reasonable ones
was a textual enterprise.149 Nor was the case solely focused on the
word “liberty.”150 The Lochner Court pointed to a variety of problems well outside of textualism, including a concern that the legislature had dissembled with regard to its legislative purpose,151 a
decidedly non-formalist approach.
Even if one believes the Lochner majority was being deceptive,
it is difficult to see how they were being deceptive in a formalist
way, and so it is little surprise that the formalist argument for
Lochner was made primarily by opponents rather than friends of
either formalism or Lochner.152 Indeed, Langdell and his followers
did not think that conceptualist formalism, which was a creature of
private law, could be applied to constitutional law at all.153 Thomas
Grey posits that the association between Lochnerism and formal147

Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (citing standard: “an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty”); see Paul N. Cox, An Interpretation and (Partial) Defense of Legal Formalism, 36 IND. L. REV. 57, 95 (2003) (“Lochner is not in fact an example of a formalist mode of adjudication; it is an example of the use of a balancing test, albeit one employed in service of a laissez faire agenda.”).
148
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
149
Id. at 52–64.
150
See id.
151
Id. at 64 (“It is manifest to us that the limitation of the hours of labor as
provided for in this section of the statute under which the indictment was found,
and the plaintiff in error convicted, has no such direct relation to, and no such
substantial effect upon the health of the employ[ee], as to justify us in regarding
the section as really a health law. It seems to us that the real object and purpose
were simply to regulate the hours of labor between the master and his employ[ees] (all being men, sui juris), in a private business, not dangerous in any
degree to morals, or in any real and substantial degree, to the health of the employés.”).
152
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1,
18 n.87 (2003).
153
See Grey, supra note 104, at 34.
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ism was drawn by Progressives, who confused the social economic
conservatism of Lochnerism with conceptualist formalism (whose
conservatism was doctrinal rather than economic),154 and in recent
years, the view of Lochner as formalist has come under considerable scrutiny.155
When considered as part of the series of cases—some upholding limitations and others striking them—throughout the period,
Lochner is better viewed as an understandably controversial application of the Court’s far-from-formalist “police powers” jurisprudence.156 Lochner may have been a misapplication of the doctrine,
but neither the doctrine itself nor Lochner’s application of it was
formalist. Even if one equates formalism with rigidity rather than
deception, the police-powers doctrine would have been a poor candidate for a formalistic approach; it was acknowledged by the
Court to be an open-ended inquiry.157 The Court itself was keenly
aware of its inability to define the scope of the police power,158 and
neither courts nor commentators ever made the kind of conceptual154

See DUXBURY, supra note 24, at 25 (“The second strand of legal formalism . . . —the tradition of laissez faire—was not a product of the academy; this
was, rather, a product of the courts.”); Grey, supra note 104, at 39 (“Progressive
and later New Deal lawyers saw classical orthodoxy as a form of conservative
ideology. In part this was a confusion of Langdellian legal science with the laissez-faire constitutional doctrines epitomized by the Lochner decision.”); Singer,
supra note 122, at 478 (“In contrast, legal theorists in the classical period (18601940) tried to separate strictly the private sphere of individual contractual freedom from the public sphere of government regulation.”); see also Thomas C.
Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473,
477 (2003) (“The joinder of Langdellian private law theory and Lochner-type
public law to create a single impressive target—the Demon of Formalism—was
a creative act on the part of Holmes and his followers among the early modern
American legal thinkers.”).
155
See Grey, supra note 104, at 39; see also Bernstein, supra note 152, at 18
n.87 (collecting sources); Cox, supra note 147, at 95 n.166 (same).
156
See Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85
B.U. L. REV. 881, 885–95 (2005); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1639–41 (2016).
157
Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1644–45.
158
See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 62 (1873) (“This
is called the police power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw that it is
much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark
its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise.”).
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ist deterministic claims about the scope of the police power that
some would have attributed to the legal formalism of the day.159
Indeed, if the police powers doctrine had a particular advantage, it
was that it required the Court to take responsibility for making the
choices it did in due process and equal protection cases without
being able to ascribe outcomes to a purportedly objective rationale160 in the way that many claim the Lochner Court did.161
3. THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY: TEXTUALISM,
ORIGINALISM, AND THE ANTI-FORMALISTS
Although many modern scholars are united in their disdain for
formalism, they share less agreement on its definition. For some,
like Martha Nussbaum and Henry Smith, formalism is a narrow162
or even wrongheaded163 approach to legal thinking. Others follow
Pound in considering it the mechanical,164 rigid,165 slavish,166 or
159

See Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1644–47.
Id. at 1680–81.
161
See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 141, at 821 n.41 (“Justice Peckham’s opinion in Lochner . . . is actually an extreme version of the formalist faith in the
mechanical deducibility of results from rules.”).
162
Martha Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 62 (2007) (describing a
case as demonstrating “why judges should not hold too narrow, or too formalistic, a conception of their role”).
163
Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance,
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1034 (2004) (describing a decision as “wrongheaded formalistic reasoning leading to economic waste”).
164
Pound, supra note 1, at 608 (describing “mechanical jurisprudence”);
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 875, 878–79 (2003) [hereinafter Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy] (explaining
that under realist view of formalism, “judges mechanically apply a disembodied
entity called ‘The Law’”).
165
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,
945 (1987) (decrying “the formalism of the common law writ system and its
rigid and inflexible procedural steps”).
166
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists 3 (St.
John’s Univ. Legal Studs. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0130, 2008),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1123498 (discussing attacks labelling formalism as “a slavish adherence to rules contrary to good
sense”).
160
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even intellectually dishonest167 application of rules.168 For still others, like Posner, it represents a simplistic and deductive approach
to law.169
It is also common to pair “formalistic” and “formulaic,”170 perhaps encouraged by Roscoe Pound’s famous description of the
formalist component of conceptualist formalism as “mechanical
jurisprudence,”171 which signaled the decline of a scientifically
167

Singer, supra note 122, at 520 (“[I]t would be disingenuous—it would be
formalist—to claim that one set of principles emerged from the original position.”); David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 539,
547 (1992) [hereinafter Strauss, Bill of Rights] (“Even if the formalist approach
would be more effective, however, it might still be unacceptably disingenuous.”).
168
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 521 (2001) (describing “the tendency
of a rule-enforcement system to create separate, formalistic procedures that discourage problem solving”); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in
Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1673 (2003) (discussing Jay Thomas’s conclusion that “the unifying theme in Federal Circuit jurisprudence over the last
ten years is a shift toward simple rules and legal formalism”). Scholars are hardly alone in this view of formalism. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972) (describing Court’s movement away from “rigid or formalistic
limitations”).
169
Posner, supra note 6, at 1664 (defining formalist interpretation as “attempts to derive legal outcomes by methods superficially akin to deduction”).
170
E.g., Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency, supra note 20, at 497 (“The Chief
Justice’s opinion . . . was formulaic and skeletal, emphasizing a formalistic
analysis . . . .”); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas:
Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 609, 616–17
(2004) (discussing “the Court’s constitutional rule formalism and the resulting
formulaic administrative approach”); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1339 (1990) (“What he could do
was use his positivist formalism to transform the inevitable value judgment
these cases required into a more formulaic judgment by strictly applying standard rules concerning the burdens of proof.”); Stephen J. Toope, Preface, 41
MCGILL L.J. 739, 740 (1996) (“In meeting that challenge, it is not enough to
rehearse the formulaic and formalistic response that binding norms follow from
the consent of states.”).
171
Pound, supra note 1, at 607 (“Undoubtedly one cause of the tendency of
scientific law to become mechanical is to be found in the average man’s admiration for the ingenious in any direction, his love of technicality as a manifestation
of cleverness, his feeling that law, as a developed institution, ought to have a
certain ballast of mysterious technicality.”).
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derived jurisprudence into the mechanical application of rules (and
especially technicalities) over substance.172 These uses, too, seem
to miss much of what is behind modern formalism, but even if they
didn’t, it is important to note up front that formulaic approaches
need not be rooted in any particular approach, formalistic, conceptualist, or otherwise. Learned Hand’s formula for determining
whether an act was negligent in United States v. Carroll Towing
Co. was formulaic, but no one would call it formalist.173 Conversely, purportedly formalist approaches like originalism require considerable discretion in their application—hardly the application of
a formula.174 The “formulaic” label does little to reveal the meaning of modern formalism.
Like modern references to Lochner’s formalism,175 modern realists have also continued to attack what they perceive to be Langdellian “legal formalism,”176 but in doing so, they completely miss
the mark. As an initial matter, the conceptualist enterprise was fo-

172

E.g., Nussbaum, supra note 162, at 62 (discussing “why judges should
not hold too narrow, or too formalistic, a conception of their role”); Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 671, 689 (1989) (“Delineations between branches of the federal
government are . . . not sharp, as a rigid separation of powers doctrine is rejected
in favor of a less formalistic and more fluid model.”).
173
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Hand, J.) (“[I]f the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B <
PL.”). So, too, Judge Posner’s preliminary injunction formula in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1985). See
supra note 111, at 593.
174
See infra the text accompanying note 213.
175
See supra the text accompanying notes 133–37.
176
E.g., Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 164, at 878–79 (describing
realist view that formalism requires “judges [to] mechanically apply a disembodied entity called ‘The Law’”); Eskridge & Peller, supra note 131, at 712
(describing the “rigid, rule-like deductivism associated with formalism”); Posner, supra note 6, at 1664 (defining formalist interpretation as “attempts to derive legal outcomes by methods superficially akin to deduction”); Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency, supra note 20, at 501 (“This is not a bright-line inquiry; Justice White preferred the uncertainty of functional inquiry to the difficulties of
‘formalistic and unbending rules.’”).
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cused on common law adjudication,177 while most modern formalist debates are primarily about interpretation of statutes and constitutions,178 a very different form of legal analysis than that envisioned by Langdell.
More importantly, conceptualism is also entirely absent in any
modern understanding of formalism. To borrow Grey’s description, the formalism of the Langdellian orthodoxy was procedural.179 Formalism in this sense is not the “strict or excessive adherence to prescribed forms” of the first definition of the Oxford English Dictionary;180 rather, it is the mathematical sense of the sixth
definition for the same entry: a “particular mathematical theory or
mode of description of a physical situation or effect.”181 As Professor Brian Leiter explains, the “science” expounded by Langdell is
better understood as approximating “Wissenschaft,” which Leiter
translates from German as “a method or discipline that when correctly followed secures the reliability of its results.”182 Modern
formalist approaches, like textualism, can be open-ended searches
for meaning drawing on a variety of sources (cases, dictionaries
and treatises, or even newspapers, popular press, and private letters

177

Cf. Grey, supra note 104, at 6, 8–10 (describing formalist view of “Conceptual Order”).
178
Thus, Cass Sunstein’s recent essay, Formalism in Constitutional Theory,
begins, “In law, what does it mean to ‘interpret’ a text, including the Constitution?” Cass R. Sunstein, Formalism in Constitutional Theory, 32 CONST.
COMMENT. 27, 27 (2017); see also Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 535–
547 (1992) (discussing topic of “Practical Reason Versus Formalism in Statutory Interpretation”).
179
See supra the text accompanying notes 108–11.
180
Schauer, OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 80, at 428 (quoting OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83).
181
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 80, at 83. The third definition
also borrows from mathematics, although in the sense of symbology rather than
proof: “The conception of pure mathematics as the manipulation according to
certain formal rules of symbols that are intrinsically meaningless.” Id. The second definition is specific to religion, and the fourth and fifth refer to different
movements in Russian theater and literature. Id.
182
Brian Leiter, Legal Realisms, Old and New, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 949, 959
(2013) [hereinafter Leiter, Old and New]; see also Tamanaha, Combination,
supra note 81, at 12 (“What jurisprudents now think of as classical formalism, it
turns out, sounds a lot like nineteenth century German legal science.”).
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depending on the topic)183—a stark contrast to conceptualist formalism’s application of logical steps approximating a mathematical proof.184 Far from early twentieth century conceptualism, late
twentieth century formalism recognizes the shared and therefore
necessarily form-bound nature of law; eschewing the determinism
of conceptual formalism, modern formalism is exactly the opposite: it rejects the possibility that the law is coherent, conceptual,
and complete because it must be discussed in some form.185 Indeed, when understood as describing a process for determining
law, the conceptual orthodoxy’s “formalism” has more in common
with the realists (who saw themselves as superior practitioners of
the Wissenschaft of law by including materials outside of cases186)
than it does with modern “formalist” approaches like textualism
and originalism.187
183

If one were to apply the rigors of mathematical formalism to textualism,
it would fail. See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2053, 2057 (2017) [hereinafter Gluck, Unfinished Business] (“I have
argued the merits of a single controlling interpretive approach to statutory interpretation; for statutory interpretation methodology to be given stare decisis effect; for a theory of the canons that understands their source and their legal status as common law. But I now believe that, although there is space for progress
on this front, formalism will never be fully effectuated in this field.”). Thus,
Abbe Gluck concludes that textualism as practiced today should not be called
formalist. See id. at 2053 (“[T]he textualism that Justice Scalia deserves so much
credit for creating never really embraced formalism at all.”).
184
Cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional
Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9. U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 173–74 (2006) (“A formalism that emphasizes fidelity to
legal texts—constitutions, statutes, and precedents—cannot fairly be characterized as conceptualist, much less as relying on some form of Platonism.”).
185
See infra the text accompanying notes 226–41; see also Easterbrook,
Original Intent, supra note 70, at 65–66 (acknowledging that statutes have gaps
and may simply fail to address a particular topic); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 542 (1988) (considering problem of
statutes that do not apply to conduct).
186
Leiter, Old and New, supra note 182, at 959. The conception of the realists as reductivist social scientists has been dramatically over-stated. See generally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and Legal Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1975,
1975 (2015).
187
On realism’s failure to deliver on its promise, see Schlag, supra note 91,
at 217–18.
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Thus, the most important thing to recognize about debates over
“formalism” in the late twentieth century is that they pertained to a
“formalism” that is quite different from the “formalism” criticized
by the likes of Pound, Llewellyn, and Holmes.188 These attacks are
really just a hangover from the early twentieth century realist attack—they are attacking a conceptualist vision that has had no
more than a handful of academic (and as far as I can tell no judicial) adherents for almost 100 years. Today’s “formalism” and
(critics of) yesterday’s “formalism” are getting at very different
senses of the word, which means that comparisons among Langdellian conceptualist formalism, Lochnerism, and modern formalist
methods like textualism or originalism should be advanced cautiously.189 It would be pretty hard to confuse one of Justice Scalia’s
“formalist” opinions with one of Justice Peckham’s.
If modern “formalism” is not Langdellian conceptualist formalism, then what is it? One point of consistency between the historical debates and modern ones is the largely negative treatment of
the concept of formalism. By “negative” in this context I mean not
that formalism is cast in a negative light (although it frequently is)
but that formalism is frequently defined not as an abstract matter
for its own purpose but rather in juxtaposition to some alternative.190 To a critic of textualism who describes it as “formalistic,”
formalism might mean something very different than it does to
someone using the term to describe an approach that simply ignores consequences. Some use the term with some connection to
the conceptualist formalism of yesteryear: to describe a logical
method of reasoning, usually based on concepts rather than conse188

But cf. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 71, at 33–34 (1994) (“The turn-ofthe-century formalists and their current heirs maintain that the Court has a single
goal: declaring and enforcing the rule of law.”).
189
Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L.
REV. 205, 215–16 (1991) [hereinafter Sunstein, Judge Bork] (“I conclude that
originalism is merely the latest version of formalism in the law. It represents the
pretense that one can decide hard cases in law by reference to value judgments
made by someone else.”).
190
See, e.g., Schlag, supra note 91, at 197 (“Of all the great disputes that
have marked American law, formalism vs. realism might well be among the
most pervasive and significant.”); Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639
(describing various approaches opposed to formalism as “antiformalist”).
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quences.191 But such uses are relatively uncommon, at least in discussing modern approaches, for the reasons described above: the
lack of adherents to a conceptualist understanding of law means
that there would be little for modern critics of conceptualist formalism to attack. Other uses are more varied.
“Formalist” and “formalistic” are frequently used with neither
explanation nor specificity to describe an approach that lacks sophistication. Thus, “formalistic” is deployed as a (frequently redundant) synonym for “simplistic”192 or lacking nuance193 or any
number of intellectual errors.194 For others, it’s “a sham”195 or “a
lie.”196 As Robert Summers describes it, “American academics and
practitioners came almost instinctively to condemn nearly every191

E.g., Posner, supra note 6, at 1663 (“Legal formalism is the idea that
legal questions can be answered by inquiry into the relation between concepts
and hence without need for more than a superficial examination of their relation
to the world of fact.”).
192
E.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and
Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1681 (2009) (“In determining whether the First Amendment applies to civil liability, the nature of the injury approach has the undeniable virtue of attempting to avoid simplistic formalist solutions.”).
193
E.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and
Public Law, 125 YALE L.J. 400, 411 (2015) (“This is obviously a highly stylized, even formalistic, vision of how actual lawmaking processes operate.”);
Trina Jones, Anti-Discrimination Law in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 423, 425 (2010)
(“In examining discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Court has resorted to a type of analytical formalism, similar to what one sees in
pretext cases, that thwarts a nuanced and contextual examination of discrimination claims and impedes greater understanding of the nature of discrimination.”).
194
E.g., Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 9, at 923 (“It is very common to
see a law professor complaining that some generalist court has blundered in its
latest interpretation of the specialized statute that the professor has made a career of studying; usually the blunder occurs because the court has, in the critic’s
view, interpreted ‘woodenly,’ ‘mechanically,’ or ‘formalistically,’ with insufficient attention to history, policy, and nuance.”).
195
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, supra note 3, at 756.
196
E.g., JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE
THEIR WAY 82 (2005) (describing “legal formalism” as “in less polite language,
a lie”); Singer, supra note 122, at 520 (using “disingenuous” and “formalist”
interchangeably); Strauss, Bill of Rights, supra note 167, at 547 (same); Sunstein, Judge Bork, supra note 189, at 215–16 (describing formalism as a “pretense” that allows judges to make value judgments “covertly”).
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thing wrong with law and legal reasoning as ‘formalistic’ (a practice that continues today in many quarters).”197 Even the modern
era’s most famous, self-acknowledged formalist, Antonin Scalia,
could not resist the temptation to enlist “formalistic” as an attack.198 There is not much to be said for or about such uses—many
are either unthinking or are extensions of more specific criticisms,
which I address above—except to point out the comfort with which
“formalist” is thrown around as an insult.
Not all uses of the term have been so unthinkingly negative,
though. Late twentieth century formalism is frequently encountered as a component of statutory or constitutional interpretation,
and many have equated it with textualist approaches to interpretation.199 According to Cass Sunstein, formalism “entails an interpretive method that relies on the text of the relevant law and that excludes or minimizes extratextual sources of law,”200 and according
to Dan Farber, “[f]ormalist writers stress that law contains a good
many rules, and that in many contexts, the application of those
rules requires little more than a grasp of English usage. They recommend a heavier reliance on plain meaning in statutory interpre-

197

Summers, supra note 44, at 244. For his part, Summers fought back, labeling approaches to law that ignore form as “substantivistic,” id. at 251, a usage
that does not seem to have caught on.
198
See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 174 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This
rule leaves no room for a formalistic distinction between facts bearing on the
number of years of imprisonment that a defendant will serve for one count (subject to the rule of Apprendi) and facts bearing on how many years will be served
in total (now not subject to Apprendi).” (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000))). In fairness to Justice Scalia, he did use the term correctly (as
I would define it) by comparing the forms of two rules and suggesting the form
of one (the Apprendi rule) should take precedence over the form of another (the
elements of a specific crime). See id. at 173 (“We have taken pains to reject
artificial limitations upon the facts subject to the jury-trial guarantee. We long
ago made clear that the guarantee turns upon the penal consequences attached to
the fact [relevant to determining punishment, the category of facts subject to
jury determination under Apprendi], and not to its formal definition as an element of the crime.”).
199
See Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639.
200
Id.
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tation.”201 Justice Scalia described himself as a formalist in large
part based on his commitment to textualism.202
What is it about textualism that makes it formalist?203 Most
make the connection between textualism and formalism through
their mutual connection to language.204 An approach to formalism
in law that emphasizes the role of text resembles the literary formalist tradition, which treats text as autonomous and ignores the
historical or social context in which the work was written.205 But
other forms of formalism seem to have less of a connection to language as an autonomous system, and so they strain the languagedependent understanding of formalism evident in the treatments of
textualism.206
Another methodology commonly associated with formalism is
originalism.207 According to Erwin Chemerinsky, for instance,
201

Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 543; see also Gluck, States as
Laboratories, supra note 12, at 1758 (offering a “modified textualism”—”a
theory that retains the fundamental text-first formalism of traditional textualism
and yet still appears multitextured enough to offer a middle way in the methodological wars”).
202
Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 25 (“Of all the criticisms
leveled against textualism, the most mindless is that it is ‘formalistic.’”).
203
See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2007) (“I will argue that textualists have placed undue emphasis on
formalist strategies.”).
204
See Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 543; see also Farber, Ages,
supra note 5, at 101–02 (comparing Scalia and Langdell).
205
See generally LOIS TYSON, CRITICAL THEORY TODAY: A USER-FRIENDLY
GUIDE 141 (2d ed. 2006) (“Because of New Criticism’s belief that the literary
text can be understood primarily by understanding its form (which is why you’ll
sometimes hear it referred to as a type of formalism), a clear understanding of
the definitions of specific formal elements is important.”); Farber, Inevitability,
supra note 133, at 534 (“Formalist interpretation, ultimately, relies on a faith in
the raw power of the word to communicate . . . .”); see also Allan Beever, Formalism in Music and Law, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 213, 216–17 (2011) (describing
the use of formalism in music, which focuses on music’s form rather than its
meaning and its connection to (conceptualist) formalism in the law).
206
Cf. Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91 (“[T]he temptation for formalists is
to err in the opposite direction, abandoning formalist methods when such methods fail to satisfy their craving for stability, logic or order.”).
207
See, e.g., Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Dorf, supra note 14, at 11
(noting that when originalism is challenged, it “is typically defended in formalist
terms”); Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A
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“[f]ormalism is inherent to the originalism of conservative Justices
like Scalia and Thomas.”208 As with textualism, not all reference is
negative. Michael Rappaport claims to apply an “originalistformalist conception of law.”209 Others, like Lawrence Solum, include both textualism and originalism as elements of what he calls
a “neoformalist” approach to constitutional interpretation.210
But the claim that originalism is formalist seems strained, at
least if formalism is going to have any independent meaning. As
Mark Tushnet points out, “[i]t seems worth noting that there is no
necessary connection between formalism and originalism.”211 Of
course, the two are not synonymous, and the better reading of such
claims (including Chemerinsky’s) is not that originalism and formalism are identical but rather that originalism is either one type of
formalism or that originalism depends in some way on formalism.212 But even such claims seem to overstate the case. It’s not
clear what is formalistic about originalism; originalism’s historical
interpretation of understood meaning shares neither the clarity of
textualism nor the same deductive objectivity of formal logical
reasoning.213 “Nonetheless,” as Tushnet points out, “the connection

Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 598 (1989) (discussing
“formalist interpretations of the Constitution, including originalism”).
208
Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 205.
209
Rappaport, supra note 15, at 114.
210
See Solum, supra note 15, at 2494.
211
Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and Constitutional Theory:
Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 581,
584 n.11 (1992).
212
Cf. Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the
Interpretive Debate Between Originalists and Non-Originalists, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1905, 1907 (2007) (“This latter form of pragmatism is simply not amenable to the formalism that originalism requires . . . .”).
213
Nor does originalism necessarily push toward non-textual clarity. See
Stephanos Bibas, Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 45–46 (2011) (“Justice Scalia likes originalism; he
also likes formalism. In some cases, however, a judge must choose between the
two. Sometimes originalism contradicts doctrines such as the exclusionary rule
even though, intuitively, modern formalists should embrace the exclusionary
rule because it is clear, simple, and instructs police exactly what not to do.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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between formalism and originalism seems to be asserted regularly.”214
It is possible that the connection to textualism is doing much of
the work of associating originalism with formalism.215 Many historical sources are expressed in textual terms, allowing textual
meaning to provide originalist understanding,216 and originalism
can be used to identify (and freeze) the meaning of text, thus freezing the law.217 But the comparison to textualism is also instructive
on the other side of the argument: If textualism is formalist by virtue of the objectivity and logic of textual analysis, originalism is
far less formalist than textualism218 and maybe even less so than

214

Tushnet, supra note 211, at 584, n.11.
See Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Lawson, supra note 14, at 859
(“[F]ormalism is inextricably tied to both textualism and originalism . . . .”);
Molot, supra note 203, at 7 (“[T]hose who favor textualism in statutory interpretation often favor originalism in constitutional interpretation.”); Krotoszynski,
supra note 20, at 1545 (“In circumstances where the Constitution provides conflicting textual mandates, formalism—particularly its strictest, originalisttextualist variety—does not work.”).
216
Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 16–18 (distinguishing
atextual intentionalism from textualist originalism); Raban, supra note 131, at
345; Shane, supra note 207, at 602 (“Originalism is the species of formalism—
that is, history partly expressed in text . . . .”).
217
HART, supra note 2, at 129 (“One way of [disguising and minimizing the
need for judges to make choices in applying rules to specific cases] is to freeze
the meaning of the rule so that its general terms must have the same meaning in
every cases where its application is in question.”); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism
and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 188 (2005).
218
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 76, at 856 (“[I]t is often exceedingly difficult to plumb the original understanding of an ancient text.”). By conceptualist
standards, originalism is not formalist at all because it denies that law is a conceptually complete enterprise, since it requires the consideration of so many
extra-legal materials. Id. at 857 (describing the difficulty of applying originalism
and explaining that “[i]t is, in short, a task sometimes better suited to the historian than the lawyer”); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 269, 295 (2017) (“[A] rigorous account of originalist methodology . . . requires an interdisciplinary approach that critically evaluates and adapts
techniques from linguistics and history but retains and modifies the sophisticated
interpretive techniques that have been developed by lawyers.”).
215
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explicitly consequentialist theories like those underlying Hand’s
Carroll Towing formula.219
The focus of modern arguments in favor of formalism (as opposed to criticizing it) has been on textualism and originalism, but
formalism goes beyond textualism and originalism. Any method of
legal reasoning that focuses on the law’s form is formalist. For example, Chief Justice Marshall’s argument in M‘Culloch v. Maryland that the Necessary and Proper Clause is better seen as an enhancement rather than a restriction on Congress’s powers because
it is found among the power-conferring clauses of Article I, Section 8 rather than among the limits in Section 9 was formalist because it focused on the clause’s location, an attribute of form.220
4. UNITY IN DISAGREEMENT: A RESPONSE TO THE ANTIFORMALISTS
Even if it is clear that modern formalist methodologies have little to do with early twentieth century Langdellian conceptualist
formalism, the arguments against them do overlap. The most obvious characteristic attacked by critics of both strains of formalism is
their purported determinism.221 As discussed above, criticisms of
the purported determinism of formalism are hardly new; they were
an essential (perhaps the singularly most important) element of the
realist critique of conceptualist formalism,222 and criticism of determinism unites critics of (what I consider misplaced) Lochnerian
formalism with critics of modern “formalist”223 techniques such as
textualism224 and originalism.225
219

See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.

1947).
220

M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) (“The clause
is placed among the powers of Congress, not among the limitations on those
powers.”).
221
See, e.g., Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1152–53.
222
See Singer, supra note 122, at 499–502. Certainly it was the determinism
of combined conceptualism and formalism that motivated Holmes, whose rejection of formalism spanned both public and private law. See William Michael
Treanor, Jam for Justice Holmes: Reassessing the Significance of Mahon, 86
GEO. L.J. 813, 854–55 (1998).
223
E.g., Dorf, supra note 14, at 11–12 (“Textualism, originalism, and other
brands of formalism do not trade flexibility for predictability, but for the false
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As was the case with the similar claim made by the realists, the
claim against the determinism of modern formalism is overstated.
While it may be difficult to find modern scholars claiming to be
formalists, it is practically impossible to find ones making a claim
that any of the “formalist” methodologies are perfectly deterministic. Justice Scalia, the figure most widely associated with modern
formalism,226 never advanced such a view. Although Scalia did
claim among the advantages of both textualism and originalism
that they were deterministic, his claim was entirely comparative (as
suggested by the title of one of his earlier papers on originalism:
“The Lesser Evil”227), not absolute.228 In addition to the historical
interpretive problems presented by originalism,229 Justice Scalia
was more than willing to acknowledge that text could be indeterminate, which he believed could be either accidental or intentional.230 Modern critics of formalism tend to overstate the claim of
promise of predictability.”); Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 534
(“[F]ormalism cannot deliver on its promise to provide greater implementation
of these important ‘rule of law’ virtues.”).
224
E.g., Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 547–48 (“Even eliminating
the canons in favor of pure textualism would not leave statutory interpretation a
mechanical task.”); Gluck, Unfinished Business, supra note 183, at 2060 (“By
applying consistent interpretive rules, formalism seeks to realize ‘rule of law
values’ such as transparency, predictability, and objectivity in the law. We have
not gotten there in statutory interpretation and we likely never will.”).
225
E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor’s Clothes: Recognizing the
Reality of Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1072–73
(2006) [hereinafter Chermerinksy, Emperor’s Clothes].
226
Fallon, supra note 10, at 15.
227
Scalia, Originalism, supra note 76, at 855 (“It is not enough to demonstrate that the other fellow’s candidate (originalism) is no good; one must also
agree upon another candidate to replace him.”).
228
See infra note 234. But see Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1150
(“Hart thinks it the duty of judges to exercise discretion . . . . Formalists like
Dworkin and Scalia are, of course, committed to denying all of
these . . . claims.”).
229
See supra text accompanying note 218.
230
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (“An ambiguity in a statute committed to
agency implementation can be attributed to either of two congressional desires:
(1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution to
the agency.”); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
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modern formalists that methodologies like textualism and originalism conclusively determine outcomes through a process of deduction.231
Although such a deductive claim might have been part of the
Langdellian conceptualist formalism, it is decidedly lacking in
modern formalist claims, which are focused more on constraining
discretion than on providing deterministic outcomes.232 The distinction between deductive determinacy and constraint is a key for
understanding modern formalist theories like Scalia’s. If constraint
can exist even in the absence of complete determinism—such as by
limiting the sources available for argument without claiming that
those sources necessarily resolve all arguments233—then modern
formalism’s lack of deductive determinacy is not a failure at all.
My point is not to refute the determinacy argument234 but rather to
highlight it as unifying a multitude of criticisms of “formalist”
methodologies. As with the realist attack on the Langdellian orthodoxy, though, formalism’s unsustainable claim of determinacy is

732 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’
along with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not
merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in
1890.”); Alan J. Meese, Justice Scalia and Sherman Act Textualism, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2013, 2015–16, 2023–24 (2017) (discussing Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Sherman Act).
231
E.g., Chemerinsky, Emperor’s Clothes, supra note 225, at 1073 (claiming
that originalists and formalists “argue that their theory allows judges to deduce
answers without discretion”).
232
See, e.g., Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1179–1180.
233
Lawrence B. Solum, Pluralism and Public Legal Reason, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 7, 15–16 (2006) (describing the various steps, including
default rules of indeterminate texts, of a neoformalist approach to interpretation).
234
In the end, the determinacy argument is more properly addressed and
responded to by modern positivism than by modern formalism. Hart himself
acknowledged that any source of law will in the hardest of hard cases ultimately
require an act of discretion on the part of a judge. See HART, supra note 2, at
129. I don’t think such an eventual jump to discretion depends on what interpretive methodology the judge employs, but more importantly, it doesn’t seem to
me that Hart needs my help in addressing what to do when the law “runs out.”
Cf. Schlag, supra note 91, at 203 n.28 (on the difficulties faced by formalists
when the law fails to comply with the “legal formalist ideal”).
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one of its critics’ own construction, perhaps because it makes such
an attractive target.235
Not only is the “formalism” of today different than the “formalism” of yesterday, the nature of the determinism being attacked
by modern anti-formalists is entirely different than that attacked by
the realists. The determinism attacked by the realists was a determinism founded in conceptualism—a determinism based in the
conceptual completeness of the law.236 Modern formalism involves
no similar conceptualist claim, even in the eyes of its critics. I suggested that modern textualists and originalists have been unfairly
painted as suggesting their methods were determinist,237 but no one
has even suggested (unfairly or otherwise) that the purported determinism of modern “formalist” techniques like textualism and
originalism is a product of conceptual completeness—that the
Framers foresaw every eventuality or that text captures every potential application of a statute.
Instead, the modern anti-formalist criticisms are of the ability
of particular forms (largely text) to convey the meaning of the
law.238 Any particular text is open to several readings, and even
practitioners of originalism confess the difficulty of determining
original meaning.239 Again, these concerns may or may not be valid, but they are completely different than a claim that there is a set
of completely determinative principles underlying the law. The
latter is a point about the substance of the law; the former is one
about the ability of different forms to supply the meaning of the
law. One is about whether law is conceptual; the other is about the
limits of form.
Thus, it is commitment to form that unites both the proponents
and (far more numerous) opponents of the various methodologies
criticized under the rubric of modern formalism. One thing that
textualism and originalism have in common is that they privilege
235

Leiter, Positivism, supra note 99, at 1146 (describing the “‘vulgar formalist’ of popular imagination” who “accepts the rational determinacy of the law”
and “the mechanical nature of judging”).
236
See supra text accompanying notes 120–26.
237
See supra text accompanying notes 221–32.
238
See Farber, supra note 133, at 534 (“Formalist methods of statutory interpretation . . . [fail to] ease communication between legislatures and citizens.”).
239
See supra the text accompanying note 218.
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form over substance, and most of their critics advance methodologies that emphasize the importance of substance.240 The argument
they levy against formalism is that its comparative advantage of
increased determinism is not enough to outweigh the suboptimal
outcomes it leads to in individual cases.241 The same was true of
early critics, such as Holmes, whose objection to formalism was
similarly pragmatic.242 Defining formalism as commitment to form
identifies its essence—from the standpoint of not only its supporters but also its critics.
5. LEAVING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY BATTLEFIELDS OF
FORMALISM BEHIND
Even as it has been the subject of debate over the last century,
formalism retains its essential feature as a commitment to interpreting law through its form instead of deriving its meaning in
some other way. Although “formalism” is a term that has become
caught up in battles over methodologies that have little to do with
formalism (such as the Langdellian conceptualism) and has been
attacked for its association with methodologies (like originalism)
for reasons having little to do with their formalism, it is still possible to identify formalism as distinct from those methodologies and
as a distinct approach to law.243 It is understandable that formalism
would become a target in those battles, but it is time to step away
from those battles to consider formalism in its own right.

240

E.g., Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 206; Dorf, supra note
14, at 9–10 ; Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 550; Posner, supra note 6,
at 1663–64; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 650–52.
241
Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 534 (“[F]ormalism cannot deliver
on its promise to provide greater implementation of . . . important ‘rule of law’
virtues.”); see also Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 641 (“More specifically, I claim that formalism, as an approach to statutory interpretation, must be
defended by empirical claims about the likely performance and activities of
courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and private parties.”).
242
Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787,
819–20 (1989).
243
See supra Part II.B.4.
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II. BRINGING FORMALISM INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Although formalism has served as a proxy for other approaches
to law, from methodologies like conceptualist determinism or textualism or more general approaches,244 formalism is not the same
as the methodologies with which it has been associated. By considering formalism separately, not only does the concept of “formalism” become more useful as a way to articulate the degree to
which a particular methodology is comparatively concerned with
form, it allows for both consideration of legal form in determining
the substance of the law and the possibility that legal form might
have its own independent meaning apart from the substance of the
law. By looking at how formalism is used outside of its twentieth
century battlegrounds, we can get a better idea of how formalism
contributes to legal thinking. Formalism has been used productively in two areas of law: understanding the role of process in law and
debates over separation of powers.
A.

Formalism as an Independent Component of Legal
Understanding
Saying that formalism is a commitment to considering law
based on its form is either saying a lot or nothing at all. No one
takes either extreme view that form is irrelevant or that it is the
only consideration. At least as a matter of informing legal analysis
that drives outcomes, the claim that form matters may at first seem
to be a pretty weak one.245
But even the limited claim that formalism is an acknowledgement that form matters goes a long way toward both classifying
and understanding arguments as comparatively formalist or nonformalist. Textualism and originalism have gotten most of the attention, but as I suggested above, there are any number of ways
that an approach can be formalist, and so it can be helpful simply
to acknowledge the degree to which a particular approach is either
formalist or not. Chief Justice Marshall’s reliance on the location
244

See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Emperor’s Clothes, supra note 225, at 1071–73.
Cf. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, supra note 101, at 610 (describing an
approach to formalism as “emphasis on forms” as “something of a pun: forms
matter”).
245
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause was formalist; by contrast, his
argument in the same case that Congress’s Article I powers should
not be read restrictively because the Framers understood that the
Constitution would have to be applied to many unforeseen circumstances was comparatively less formalist.246 Simply having a concept to distinguish approaches that depend on form from those that
depend on something else is valuable. Thus, understanding “formalism” as relying on form as a component of legal understanding
(and argumentation) has its own value by allowing descriptive
claims about the use of form quite apart from normative claims
about whether or when to do so.
One might be a formalist for widely varying reasons based in
widely varying commitments. Justice Scalia justified his formalism
on institutional grounds, as necessary to a system that allocates
power to authors rather than appliers of positive law,247 but he
could also have justified it on a claim that the Framers were simply
smarter than we are and that their utterances were therefore deserving of our deference. Those would be very different normative justifications for originalism even though the formalism of the approach might remain the same. Similarly, one could argue the relative difficulty of deciphering text that was written ten years ago
and that which was written 230 years ago means that textualism is
less valuable in the latter than the former case while still acknowledging that textualism would be equally formalist in either case.
Many methodologies represent a commitment to form, and some of
them for similar reasons, but formalism and formalist methodologies are not all justified by a single set of considerations.248 Recognizing formalism as a distinct element of a number of methodologies allows one to separately consider both of those methodologies
themselves and the formalism that they rely upon.
Distinguishing formalism from the methodologies it has been
associated with opens the door to considering formalism’s broader
role in many theories of law. Formalism is present not only in tex246

See M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–10 (1819).
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1182–85.
248
Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 638 (“It is not easy to define the
term ‘formalism,’ partly because there is no canonical kind of formalism.” (internal citation omitted)).
247

2020]

TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FORMALISM

163

tual approaches like textualism and originalism but also in approaches that focus on source (as in positivism), process, and structure.249 Although Hart himself criticized conceptualist “formalism,”250 his positivism was perfectly formalist in that it suggested
the centrality of form—in his case the point of origin—of law.251
Hart’s rule of recognition is itself formalist, since it defines what is
law by virtue of its discernible features, not its substance.252 It is
little wonder, then, that Schauer started with formalism in developing what he would eventually come to call “presumptive positivism;”253 it is formalism that unites Schauer’s account of rule-based
decision-making (which, as I suggested above, need not be formalist) with Hart’s positivism. Formalism extends not only to text or
location (as in Marshall’s analysis of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in M‘Culloch254), but also to source.255 The predilection
that we have in most cases to identify law by its source (we treat
judicial opinions differently than statutes and statutes differently
than political stump speeches) is itself formalist. In this sense,
originalism’s emphasis on the text as understood by a specific
group (those alive at the time)256 makes it doubly formalist because
it emphasizes a form of form—text as both the basis for understanding and the source of the accepted understanding of that text.
Thus my argument that we are all formalists, since form plays a
part in virtually any practical understanding of law. Hart’s formalist rule of recognition works for most purposes—most debate is on
its ability to handle the hard cases, an implied concession that it
largely handles the easy ones.257 That is not to say we are all for249

See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 103, at 2061 (“Legal positivism overlaps
with both legal realism and legal formalism, although it is identical to neither.”).
250
See supra the text accompanying note 120.
251
See HART, supra note 2, at 94–95.
252
Id.
253
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 196.
254
See M‘Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407–10 (1819).
255
See Meese, supra note 230, at 2027–28 (Describing “super statutes” and
how judges impute the source of a text when deciding how to apply interpretative methods).
256
See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power
to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 552–53 (1994) (describing process of
determining original meaning).
257
HART, supra note 2, at 94–95.

164

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:113

malists to the same degree or that formalism informs all interpretive methodologies equally. But simply being able to identify formalism as a component of different methodologies and to evaluate
the merits of that formalism in its own right—as a distinct component of those methodologies with its own justification—is a step
toward engaging formalism on its own terms.
But modern formalism goes beyond an abstract understanding
that form matters to law; it is a claim about why form matters to
law. Modern formalist methodologies like textualism and originalism are grounded in an understanding that our conversations about
law are necessarily limited to characteristics of law we can perceive in a shared way.258 Modern formalism recognizes that, much
more than assigning winners and losers in disputes, law communicates.259 Separating formalism from the outcome-driven debates
that have dominated discussion of its merits—like debates over
textualism and originalism and their alternatives—allows a whole
new set of claims about formalism and its value. Part of law’s value is in its ability to communicate, and it is through formalism that
that value can be recognized and realized.
In the end, the question is not whether form matters—form
clearly matters. The real question is how viewing the law through
the lens of form helps us better understand the law and how it operates. I will focus briefly on how formalism operates in two very
different aspects of law before considering some consequences of
formalism for how we think about law.
B.
Formalism and Process
All process appears as form, but considering formalism as a
separate aspect of process allows us to distinguish its role in process. In U.S. constitutional law, the process of bicameralism and
presentment is arguably the most central process there is, since it

258

See HART, supra note 2, at 125; Easterbrook, Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 15, at 64 (describing legal interpretation as “a social enterprise”).
259
See, e.g., id. at 124–25; Farber, Inevitability, supra note 133, at 549
(“[T]he best argument for formalism is that it makes the meaning of legal texts
more transparent, and therefore more accessible to ordinary citizens, legislators,
and others . . . .”).
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defines what is and is not federal statute law.260 A formalist approach to bicameralism and presentment allows one to distinguish
the process itself from its justifications, thereby providing intellectual space to consider both separately. That ability is particularly
helpful with a process like bicameralism and presentment, a process that has remained unchanged even while many of its underlying justifications have changed.261 The adoption of the Seventeenth
Amendment altered the constituency of the Senate (from the legislatures of the States to the people of the States), thereby shifting
the role of the Senate and with it the justification underlying the
process for making federal statute law without changing the form
of the process at all. 262 A formalist approach would ignore this
underlying change in the Senate’s constituency, but more importantly, a formalist approach allows one to distinguish this
change in the Senate’s constituency from other changes and their
effects on the Senate’s role in making federal statute law, such as
the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendment’s expansions of the franchise263 or the Civil War’s alteration of the political and economic
forces that may have justified the original organization of the Senate.264
A formalist approach to process treats process as distinct from
its underlying purpose. In Neder v. United States, the Supreme
Court confronted the question of whether taking an element of a
criminal offense away from the jury could ever be harmless er-

260

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct
Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1347, 1353–55 (1996).
262
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see Amar, supra note 261, at 1353–55; David
N. Schleicher & Todd J. Zywicki, The Seventeenth Amendment, INTERACTIVE
CONST.,
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/
amendment-xvii/interps/147 (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
263
U.S. CONST. amend XV (prohibiting denial of right to vote “on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
(prohibiting denial of the right to vote “on account of sex”).
264
See generally Schleicher & Zywicki, supra note 262 (explaining how the
Seventeenth Amendment was passed in the wake of the Civil War and “removed
from state legislatures the power to choose U.S. Senators and gave that power
directly to voters in each state”).
261
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ror.265 The majority concluded it could, especially when the appellate court found that the element at issue (whether Neder’s failure
to report “over $5 million in income” was a material falsehood for
the purposes of the tax fraud statute266) “was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence such that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error.”267 In so doing, the Court applied the standard for evaluating such errors it had established in
Johnson v. United States,268 whether the error “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”269
To the majority, the question was one of fairness, perhaps the most
substantive question of all.270
Justice Scalia, whose formalism reached far beyond textualism
and originalism, dissented in a characteristically formalist way.271
For him, the question was simply whether the conviction had complied with the Sixth Amendment requirement of trial by jury, explicitly rejecting the majority’s fairness analysis.272 The trial, according to Scalia, did not follow the required form for a federal
criminal trial and the certainty of the outcome (a matter of substance) was no answer to the defect in form.273
That is not to say that the form exists absent a justification
(Scalia offered one: mistrust of judges274), but whether we could
all agree that Neder was actually guilty (which was the majority’s
understanding of the justification for the form275) or whether the
265
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9 (1999). In the interest of full disclosure, I was one of Neder’s attorneys at the Supreme Court, although I did not
work on the harmless-error portion of the case.
266
Id. at 16.
267
Id. at 17.
268
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
269
Neder, 527 U.S. at 9 (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469).
270
See id. at 9.
271
See id. at 30–40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272
Id. at 31–32; U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
273
Neder, 527 U.S. at 34 (“The very premise of structural-error review is
that even convictions reflecting the ‘right’ result are reversed for the sake of
protecting a basic right.”).
274
Id. at 32.
275
Id. at 18–20 (majority opinion).
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judge in question was actually untrustworthy (which was Scalia’s
understanding of the justification for the form276) was beside the
point. And here we see the connection to Schauer’s rule-based decision-making.277 Although there might be a justification underlying the form, for Scalia, that justification was irrelevant to the
question of whether to insist that the form be observed in the particular case.278 For the majority, the justification was always relevant.279 Justice Stevens, who dissented separately, was also willing
to consider justification over form, suggesting that the Court’s insistence on juries might vary depending on the type of case, since
some cases present greater threats to the justification he credited
than others.280
Scalia’s formalism, unlike the majority’s pragmatism, allows
juries to have value independent of their justifications. The independent value of forms like juries is important in a variety of ways.
As Schauer explains, it allows judges to be wrong about the (comparatively difficult to determine) justifications for particular forms
while still having the power to adjudicate disputes over the forms
themselves.281 But it also allows for the possibility that juries are
an instantiation of an under-theorized set of justifications, some of
which are unrelated or might even be in tension with each other.
276

See id. at 39. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 231–32.
278
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 39–40; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 498–99 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (discounting “bureaucratic realm of
perfect equity” suggested by Justice Breyer’s dissent but not arguing that that
the jury might have come to a different conclusion than a judge would have).
Not that Justice Scalia was allergic to purpose. He advanced one in Neder itself
(even if he didn’t think the purpose was served in the case) and in other cases on
the jury right. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 39–40 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were
unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.”).
279
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17–18 (majority opinion).
280
Id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“[T]his Court has not been properly sensitive to the importance of protecting
the right to have a jury resolve critical issues of fact when there is a special danger that elected judges may listen to the voices of voters rather than witnesses. A
First Amendment case and a capital case will illustrate my point.” (emphasis
added)).
281
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 131–34.
277
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Are juries really better at finding facts than judges (which figured
prominently in the majority’s justification282 but was lacking in
Scalia’s political one283), and are they less susceptible to political
pressures than judges (which figured in both Scalia’s and Stevens’s
justifications, albeit in opposing fashions284)? Who knows? The
answer might even depend on who is asking.285
The purpose of juries is many-faceted and it may be that no
single theory justifies juries.286 Perhaps because it cannot identify a
particular justification for juries, the Court has consistently remained committed to the jury form as a form independent of the
effect on outcomes in jury-rights cases, from Strauder v. West Virginia287 in 1880 through the twenty-first century Apprendi-BlakelyBooker line of cases regarding the role of juries in the modern
criminal sentencing system.288 In all of those cases, the Court has
relied on the Constitution’s insistence of the jury form without requiring the defendant to articulate that the justification for the form
was implicated in his particular case.289
Far from formalism in the sense of rigidity, acknowledging the
independent value of form allows for the justifications for and
meaning of forms to vary over time, circumstance, and perspective.
In Strauder, for instance, the Court identified two separate harms
282

See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17–20 (majority opinion).
Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
284
See id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id at 34. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
285
It is also possible that we might want juries because of their ability to
consider factors outside the facts or law in rendering their verdicts, see Peter
Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 81, 129–32, a justification whose contours would be particularly
difficult to articulate since the sensibilities required might be very different in
very different circumstances. Of course, that raises the question of why acquittals by judges receive similar finality. See id. at 132–35.
286
See Robert C. Walters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 SMU L. REV. 319, 321–23 (2005) (discussing numerous
historical opinions on role and importance of juries).
287
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
288
See generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005).
289
See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 308; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 500; Blakely, 542
U.S. at 308; Booker, 543 U.S. at 230.
283
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(the inability to have members of the same race on one’s jury and
limitations on the right to serve on a jury) suffered by two separate
individuals (the defendant and the prospective juror respectively),
but required that neither harm be realized (there being no affirmative right for members of any particular race to serve on any particular jury) for there to be a violation.290 Strauder’s insistence on
the jury form opened up the possibility of a shift in the meaning of
jury service—one that emphasizes the role in governance that jury
service signifies and the implications of including different groups
in that form of governance.291
C.
Formalism and Separation of Powers
As the previous mention of bicameralism and presentment suggests, formalism can play (and has played) a prominent role in the
field of constitutional separation of powers.292 Why “formalism”
should play an important role in separation of powers is something
of a mystery. If “formalism” is a textual interpretive approach,293 it

290

Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306–09; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
85–88 (1986).
291
See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48–49 (1992) (holding that racially motivated strikes by defense lawyers are constitutional violations in part
because of political significance of jury service to jurors).
292
See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND.
L.J. 665, 676 (2016) (describing “formalism’s ascendancy” in separation of
powers doctrine); Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1517–18; Lawson, supra note
14, at 859; Magill, supra note 21, at 1183; Strauss, Foolish Inconsistency, supra
note 20, at 489–90; Resnik, supra note 172, at 675–76; Huq & Michaels, supra
note 14, at 425; Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41
DUKE L.J. 449, 449–50 (1991). As with many treatments of formalism and functionalism, though, it is easy to over-state the divide. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998); Huq & Michaels, supra
note 14, at 435.
293
Krotoszynski, supra note 20, at 1527–28 (“Formalism relies on a kind of
textualist analysis and places great structural weight on the Vesting Clauses of
Articles I, II, and III.”); Linda D. Jellum, ‘‘Which Is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers,
56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 861 (2009) (“Formalism is, thus, a textually literal approach that relies primarily on the vesting clauses to define categories of pow-
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is not clear why it would apply in a distinct way in the separation
of powers context. Separation of powers cases do not present unusual interpretive challenges294 (although there is a paucity of applicable text and the Court’s determinations are difficult to reverse,
the same is true of virtually any constitutional question). Liz
Magill suggests that separation of powers cases present the
rules/standards problem that Schauer treats under the rubric of
formalism,295 but again, it’s not clear how separation of powers
presents this problem in a distinct way, and I think formalism can
be distinguished from rule-based decision-making in the separation
of powers context as easily as it can in any other.296 Yet formalism
is acknowledged to be one of the two dominant approaches to separation of powers297—a primacy of position it enjoys in virtually
no other area of legal thought.
The answer, I think, lies in the centrality of form to separation
of powers debates.298 The question in such cases is how to attribute
power to the institutional forms defined in the Constitution rather
er—legislative, executive, and judicial—and to identify the owner of each power.”). Nor is the formalism of separation of powers particularly originalist.
294
Manning, supra note 20, at 1947–50.
295
Magill, supra note 21, at 1138; see also Huq & Michaels, supra note 14,
at 355–56.
296
The rules versus form distinction is readily apparent in the “formalist”
position of attributing actions to branches. See Lawson, supra note 14, at 858
(“The separation of powers principle is violated whenever the categorizations of
the exercised power and the exercising institution do not match and the Constitution does not specifically permit such blending.”). That approach to applying
the constraints of form is dependent on identifying the nature of a particular
governmental action as either executive, legislative, or judicial, an inquiry that is
about as rule-like as determining whether a particular act was “reasonable.” See
Magill, supra note 21, at 1141–42; Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1238 n.45 (“The problem of distinguishing the three functions of government has long been, and continues to be,
one of the most intractable puzzles in constitutional law.”).
297
Magill, supra note 21, at 1136 (“Among commentators there are two
well-defined and competing positions: formalism and functionalism.”).
298
See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 841, 853 (2014) (citation omitted) (“I focus here on formal or structural
attributes of organizations, including agency design and assigned functions . . . . I limit my attention to these less subjective and more formalist, structural elements in order to gain some descriptive and predictive traction.”).
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than a substantive evaluation299 of an act in comparison to a constitutional standard like “equal protection of the laws”300 or “freedom
of speech.”301 That is, separation of powers controversies are no
more amenable to resolution by rule than other areas of constitutional discourse, but they are more closely tied to form than other
areas of constitutional discourse. Formalism continues to matter in
separation of powers debates because form matters in separation of
powers debates.
Moreover, unlike in many contexts, formalism itself is not agnostic as to outcome in separation of powers cases. As Magill explains, applying formalism in separation of powers can “have dramatic practical consequences;”302 adherence to the forms of the
Constitution could place in question the existence of most of the
administrative state.303 Formalism’s claim that form matters is also
a claim that form should matter. It is a commonplace in the separation of powers debate that the innovations of the administrative
state are at the very least in tension with governmental form as described in the Constitution, and so formalism is hardly neutral with
regard to the existence of such innovations on constitutional
form.304 (How much it should matter is a question beyond the
scope of my inquiry.)
But even with regard to institutions clearly falling within the
constitutional forms—Congress, the executive, and the courts—
formalism plays a major part in the debate. Magill describes both
formalism and its purported opposite, functionalism:

299

See Summers, supra note 44, at 256 (“The very subject-matter of rules
establishing government structures is formal, in contrast to the content of the
law created and administered by and through the system of government.”);
Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 16, at 405 (“Under formalist ideology, the
Court’s role in statutory interpretation is not to facilitate the dominant political
coalition’s evolving preferences, but to protect the formal structures of our democracy.”).
300
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
301
See id. amend. I.
302
Magill, supra note 21, at 1140.
303
Id. at 1140–41; Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 494 (1987).
304
See Magill, supra note 21, at 1140.
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Among commentators there are two well-defined
and competing positions: formalism and functionalism . . . .
....
. . . . [T]he structural provisions of the Constitution specify the type (legislative, executive, judicial)
and place (Congress, President, Supreme Court) of
all governmental power. The judge assessing the validity of an institutional arrangement must first
identify the type of power being exercised and, unless one of the explicitly provided-for exceptions is
relevant, make certain that that power is exercised
by an official residing in the appropriate governmental institution.
....
Formalism’s competitor, functionalism, is likewise a set of postulates rather than a single precept.
Where a formalist is committed to rule-based decisionmaking, a functionalist . . . would resolve structural disputes “not in terms of fixed rules but rather
in light of an evolving standard designed to advance
the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of
powers.” The agreed-upon “ultimate purpose” is to
achieve an appropriate balance of power among the
three spheres of government.305
Putting aside the rules and standards distinctions for the reasons
outlined above, Magill’s description of formalism in the separation
of powers context tracks an understanding of formalism as commitment to form.306
Indeed, it is in separation of powers that one currently sees
formalism taking a central role in the scholarship, being applied in
305

Id. at 1136–43 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Thomas W. Merrill, The
Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 231
(1991)).
306
See id. at 1138–40.
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at least two ways: First, formalist separation of powers decisions
are generally more concerned with giving effect to the forms laid
out in the Constitution307 than with other considerations, such as
convenience or giving effect to the justifications underlying those
forms.308 One can readily identify Myers v. United States309 as
more “formalist”310 than Morrison v. Olson311 because Myers produces a rule more closely tied to the forms described in the Constitution312 than Morrison, which requires an analysis of the consequences of any particular limit on the President’s power.313 That is
not to say that Morrison does not attempt to follow the Constitution, just that Morrison is more concerned with satisfying what it

307

See O’Connell, supra note 298, at 899–900 (“A formalist approach,
which focuses on structural attributes in defining the constitutional boundaries
among the three branches, would find many boundary organizations problematic.”).
308
Pildes, Institutional Formalism, supra note 21, at 2 (“This formalism
consists of treating the governmental institution involved as more or less a formal black box to which the Constitution (or other source of law) allocates specific legal powers and functions.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Formalism,
Functionalism, Ignorance, Judges, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 13, 14–15
(1998) (answering any number of functionalist arguments in voice of Robert
Bork saying, “That’s not what the Constitution says”).
309
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
310
See Magill, supra note 21, at 1138 n.37 (listing cases that show that Supreme Court uses both “formalist and functionalist approaches”).
311
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
312
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 116 (“From this division on principles, the reasonable construction of the Constitution must be that the branches should be
kept separate in all cases in which they were not expressly blended, and the
Constitution should be expounded to blend them no more than it affirmatively
requires.”). Even if one thinks that Chief Justice Taft’s understanding of the
relative powers of the three branches was incorrect (that the correct understanding of the “legislative” power includes with it the power to regulate removal of
executive officers, see id. at 128), the analysis required is form-driven. Myers is
itself a study in the distinction between formalism as an analytical tool and a
methodology. Although the rule announced in Myers was formalist, see id. at
175–76, the analysis leading to that formalist rule, which was largely a combination of intentionalist originalism and consequentialism, was not.
313
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693 (expressing concern over whether a limitation
“sufficiently deprives the President of control . . . to interfere impermissibly
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws”).
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considers the principles served by the forms rather than the forms
themselves.314
Second, formalist separation of powers approaches maintain
that the forms described in the Constitution actually determine the
answers in separation of powers cases.315 The determinism of separation of powers formalism seemingly harkens to the Langdellian
conceptualist formalism I’ve argued is a creature of the past,316 but
this “formalist” determinism is actually quite different. Whereas
conceptualist formalism supposedly maintained that first principles
provide an answer to every legal question without gap,317 separation of powers formalism explicitly accepts the existence of gaps—
gaps in power whose consequence is that a particular exercise of
power is unconstitutional because it does not fit the constitutionally prescribed forms.318 Indeed, if Magill’s description of the functionalist approach (whether a particular assertion of power advances “the ultimate purposes of a system of separation of powers”319)
is correct, it is functionalists who more closely resemble the Langdellian conceptualism of the past by suggesting that those “ultimate purpose[s]” are both identifiable and are capable of determining the outcomes in every case.320 By relying on form rather than
purpose, formalist approaches do not require that there be a conceptually complete understanding like an “ultimate purpose” un-

314
See Barnett, supra note 292, at 675–76 (describing Morrison as a “notable exception” to formalism that has dominated presidential removal decisions).
315
See Magill, supra note 21, at 1139–42 (“When examining the validity of
an institutional arrangement . . . a formalist would first have to determine what
sort of power these entities or officers were exercising.”).
316
See, e.g., Redish & Cisar, supra note 292, at 454 (“It is important to emphasize that formalism, as we employ the term, is not intended to imply imposition of rigid, abstract interpretational formulas derived from an originalistic
perspective.”).
317
See Grey, supra note 104, at 7–8, 11 (“[T]he heart of classical theory was
its aspiration that the legal system be made complete through universal formality, and universally formal through conceptual order.”).
318
See Lawson, supra note 14, at 859–60 (claiming that formalists find that
“[a]ny exercise of governmental power . . . must either fit within one of the three
formal categories thus established or find explicit constitutional authorization”).
319
Magill, supra note 21 at 1142 (quoting Merrill, supra note 223, at 231).
320
Id. at 1142.
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derlying the system laid out in the Constitution321 because it is the
forms, not the purposes of the Constitution that determine whether
a particular power can be exercised by a particular part of the federal government.322
The separation of powers context, which in many ways is an
inquiry into the consequences of form, is an attractive place to apply a reconsidered conception of formalism, and it is here that one
indeed sees formalism seriously engaged by both sides of the debate. But if one truly engages formalism, the implications reach far
beyond questions of process and separation of powers and certainly beyond its typical modern application in statutory and constitutional interpretation. Formalism has long been recognized as a way
of thinking about law, although past debates have sought to limit it
to either particular methodologies (in support of textualist and
originalist claims) or readily refutable claims of complete determinacy and intentional ignorance of consequences (in support of realist ones), with both sides worried about the implications of formalism for ascertaining the substance of the law. If we are all indeed
formalists (as I claim we are), it is appropriate to consider the implications of our formalism, implications of thinking about the
form of law as distinct from its substance. When one steps aside
from debates about formalism animated by concerns over the outcomes it purportedly leads to, we are free to see the true power of
321
Formalist separation of powers approaches have been criticized for relying on “workable distinctions among the three categories of governmental power,” Magill, supra note 21, at 1141, which one could translate into similarly
conceptually complete understandings of the difference between “executive,”
“legislative,” and “judicial” power. See id. at 1139 (quoting Lawson, supra note
14, at 859–60); see also Barnett, supra note 292, at 711 (“Formalism is ill-suited
for interpreting indeterminate text.”). But that criticism of modern formalism is,
like the Realist criticism of conceptualist formalism, a misplaced criticism of
determinism, not formalism. Of course, as is the case with the modern antiformalist critique, there is little argument that separation of powers formalism is
comparatively less deterministic than its functionalist counterpart. The question
of whether a prosecutor’s function is “executive” is subject to more widespread
agreement than whether a particular restriction on a particular officer is one that
“sufficiently deprives the President of control . . . to interfere impermissibly
with his constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.”
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693.
322
See Magill, supra note 21, at 1139–1140.
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formalism as informing the content of law in ways distinct from
case outcomes.
III. FORMALISM AND THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
Many are understandably consumed with formalism’s role in
controlling outcomes in legal disputes—for determining the substance of the law.323 Most scholars (and hopefully all judges) seek
approaches for their ability to determine outcomes, and students of
formalism are no different. That was certainly true of the various
approaches to formalism in the twentieth century debates. In the
early, Langdellian orthodoxy, formalism provided a process for
divining the common law.324 The early realists attacked formalism
in order to provide space for their more pragmatic approach.325 The
rise in the last half of the twentieth century of formalist methodologies like textualism and originalism were similarly driven by a
desire to determine outcomes, albeit motivated by the desire to
constrain judges rather than to realize some ultimate conception of
law.326 The late twentieth century realist/pragmatist response similarly attacked what it perceived as the formalism of textualism and
originalism to provide discretion to judges to find better answers
than could be found in the text.327 Those twentieth century debates,
concerned as they were about how formalism might drive outcomes, largely ignored formalism for its ability to understand law
aside from outcomes.
Formalism does have a role in driving outcomes, but the power
of formalism goes beyond outcomes. Formalism not only provides
a way to identify law’s content, it explains much of the meaning of
323

See, e.g., Grey, supra note 104, at 5 (emphasis added) (describing “heart
of the theory” as Langdell’s idea “that through scientific methods lawyers could
derive correct legal judgements”).
324
See Grey, supra note 104, at 5 (“Langdell believed that through scientific
methods lawyers could derive correct legal judgments from a few fundamental
principles and concepts . . . .”).
325
See, e.g., id. at 4–5.
326
Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 71, at 1176, 1184.
327
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Foundation, supra note 10, at 206; Dorf, supra
note 14, at 9–10; Farber, Ages, supra note 5, at 91; Posner, supra note 6, at
1157; Sunstein, Empirically, supra note 4, at 639.
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law. Like rule-based decision-making, formalism requires the categorization of conduct, and that categorization has profound effects far outside the determination of cases.328 The categorization
that formalism requires establishes the language of law, a language
through which the law expresses societal approval and disapproval
of particular conduct.329 That language (of social sanction and condemnation) affects the meaning of conduct far beyond the question
of whether an individual will be held civilly or criminally liable.330
A.
Formalism’s Role in Legal Decision-making
Absent the demands of formalism, there would be no need
for—indeed, no means by which to have—conversations about the
law. As discussed above, because law is a shared enterprise, the
content of the law can only be described through reference to its
form.331 Although our philosopher kings might be able to apply the
law without reducing it to language, we cannot. If the form of the
law determines the language we use to discuss legal concepts, the
dictates of formalism control the conceptual language of law, and
it is only through formalism that one can understand and realize
the meaning of law, quite apart from the outcomes produced by
law.
1. FORMALISM AND CATEGORIES
As Fred Schauer points out, rule-based decision-making is an
exercise in generalization and, hence, categorization.332 Rules gen328

Infra Part III.A.1. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 25–26, 10–

12.
329

Infra Part III.A.1.
Infra Part III.B.
331
See supra the text accompanying notes 47–51.
332
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 25–26; see also HART, supra note 2, at 123
(“All rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as instances of
general terms.”); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CALIF. L. REV.
1103, 1125, 1131–32 (2004) (describing cognition and categorization in law);
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 581, 593 (1989) (“[I]t is the essence of the judicial function to
draw lines, because it is the essence of the judicial function to be governed by
lines, the lines of the logical and analytical categories.” (emphasis omitted)).
330
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eralize by describing specific instances of conduct, such as the
speed I happen to be driving, as either “over the limit” or “within
the limit.” On Main Street, both thirty miles per hour and ninety
miles per hour are “over the limit” compared to the twenty-five
mile-per-hour speed limit, and both eight miles per hour and twenty-four miles per hour are “within the limit.” Both statements are
true even though thirty is only one-third as fast as ninety and twenty-four is three times as fast as eight and whether I am an experienced NASCAR driver in a golf cart covered in pillows or a blindfolded inebriate driving a gasoline tanker. Conduct that looks quite
different from some perspectives (even the limited perspective of
dangerousness) is generalized by the twenty-five mile per hour
speed limit as either “over the limit” or “within the limit.”
In the course of generalizing, rules categorize. In the case of
my speed example, the rule categorizes by lumping all speeds over
twenty-five as “over the limit” and all speeds twenty-five and under as “within the limit” but also by evaluating my driving in terms
of its speed. Before a rule can be applied to conduct, the conduct
must first be categorized as subject to the rule333—in my case,
speeding instead of blindfolded driving or drunk driving. Schauer,
in his institutional approach to rule-based decision-making, describes this function of rules as “jurisdictional” in that the rule, by
including some conduct as within the rule and some conduct outside it, establishes the scope of the conduct subject to any particular adjudicator and, hence, its jurisdiction.334 In Schauer’s institutional model, categorization both allows adjudicators to decide
whether a rule has been violated and also allocates power between
authors and appliers of law.335 The categories both provide the rule
of decision and remove some aspects of conduct from the purview
of the adjudicator.
333
SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 24 (“Once we separate a prescriptive rule’s
factual predicate from its consequent, we see the factual predicate as a generalization . . . .”); see also Schauer, Formalism, supra note 7, at 534, 539–40 (on
categories).
334
See SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 231–32 (“[T]hus, the essence of rulebased decision-making lies in the concept of jurisdiction, for rules, which narrow the range of factors to be considered by particular decision-makers, establish and constrain the jurisdiction of those decision-makers.”).
335
See id. at 158, 231–232.
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But, in addition to making it easier to decide cases or allocate
power, the categorization that rules require has an another effect: it
makes the categories themselves a relevant (or irrelevant) subject
for law, and this is where formalism departs from rule-based decision-making. Formalism acknowledges that rules must appear in
some form, and it is the form of those rules that controls the categories of conduct subject to legal regulation. Categorization is necessary for decision by rule, but it is not the same as decision by
rule. Before we can evaluate whether I’m exceeding the speed limit, we have to agree that my speed is what is relevant rather than
whether I am blindfolded or drunk.
And it is the form of the rule that sets the categories. It is the
traffic safety rule’s form as a speed limit that dictates an inquiry
into a single attribute of my driving—how fast I am driving—as
opposed to an open-ended inquiry as to whether my driving is likely to result in some social harm. Conversely, if we phrase the inquiry as whether I am driving the car “well,” we don’t know
whether we’re having a conversation about how fast I am driving,
whether I have avoided hitting other cars or pedestrians, or whether I am driving with panache. Categorization limits the conversation to one about speed, drastically constricting the range of arguments relevant to whether I have violated the applicable law.
It is again tempting to revert to rules rather than form, but the
act of categorization is driven by the rule’s form, not by the degree
to which a particular mandate is either rule-like or standard-like.
Form can limit arguments without setting a rule that determines
outcomes. The inquiry into whether I am driving “too fast” is of a
more limiting form than the inquiry into whether I am driving
“well” because it requires me to ignore some aspects of “well” that
are irrelevant to my speed, such as whether I am blindfolded. The
form of the inquiry is a limitation on available arguments even
though “too fast” (like “well”) more closely resembles a standard
than a rule. Even among standards, form has power. Tort law’s
categorization of conduct as “reasonable” and “unreasonable” suggests a different comparison between actors than if the law had
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settled on “cautious” or “thoughtful” as the standard for avoiding
liability in a negligence action.336
Recognizing the power of form to categorize presents an additional challenge to the anti-formalist critique, which is centered
largely on formalism’s inability to provide what critics consider to
be suitably determinative outcomes.337 That is not to say that form
is irrelevant to outcomes; it certainly is. Under the common law
forms of action, failure to satisfy the form dictated by a particular
writ necessarily led to the lack of a remedy: the forms dictated by
the writs dictated the substantive law.338 But the force of law is not
only its determinations, it is also in the categories we use to talk
about whether behavior is an appropriate subject for the legal system in the first place. In order for critics of formalism to complete
their case, they need to recognize and answer this second strength
of formalism over other methods of legal inquiry, particularly realism, which provides answers without need or benefit of clear categories.339 Focused as it is on outcomes, the realist critique generally ignores the effect of law on argumentation—that arguments are
either included or excluded from consideration, not by virtue of the
substance of the law, but by its form.340 Llewellyn was more right
than he knew when he explained that “to classify is to disturb.”341
It is not that outcomes are irrelevant, but it takes little imagination to visualize how different our legal system would be if outcomes—even identical outcomes—were dictated by notions of
justice unencumbered by the necessities and inconveniences of
form. Such “rule of law” concerns are at the root of much of the
formalist enterprise; they certainly were for Justice Scalia when he
declared, “Of all the criticisms leveled against textualism, the most
mindless is that it is formalistic. The answer to that is, of course
336

See BEEVER, supra note 129, at 253–54.
See supra Part I.B.3.
338
Subrin, supra note 165, at 914–16.
339
See id. at 1001 (discussing how realism “became skepticism about any
type of legal categories and definitions”).
340
See id.
341
Llewellyn, supra note 98, at 453. Llewellyn did not seem to notice that
his response—to continually adjust the “received categories,” id., based on new
information—was no less a disturbance than the “received” categorization he
resisted.
337
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it’s formalistic! The rule of law is about form . . . . Long live formalism! It is what makes us a government of laws and not of
men.”342 It is not the social optimality or political legitimacy of
legal outcomes that distinguish law from majority vote or brute
force, it is law’s reliance on form and what that form requires of
legal actors in the course of generating those outcomes. Formalism
does not reject the possibility of any particular outcome; it rejects
the possibility of philosopher kings. Any evaluation of formalism
must include in its calculus the value that form contributes to the
process of generating outcomes, not just the outcomes that the process generates.
2. DETERMINACY VS. THE DELIBERATIVE PROCESS
Even if formalism’s categories do not always lead to definite
outcomes, they nevertheless shape the deliberative process. Such
has been the experience of both the Due Process343 and Equal Protection Clauses344 of the Constitution. Equal protection, in particular, has faced a troubled history despite the fact that all can agree
on the nature of the equality inquiry345: that it is a comparative one.
This is so because the equality comparison lacks any meaningful
and widely agreed upon form346 and therefore lacks workable categories for analysis;347 there is nothing inherent in the concept of
“equality” to tell us what is relevant or irrelevant in any particular

342

Scalia, Common-Law Courts, supra note 11, at 25 (emphases in original).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV § 1.
344
Id. amend. XIV § 1.
345
See, e.g., Derek W. Black, The Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s
Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indifference Can Cure It, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 534–36 (2007) (explaining that question of
“what is means to deny someone equal protection under the law” has a complex
history, especially with regard to racial discrimination).
346
In this regard, one can also compare the history of procedural due process, which deals with a relatively small, closed set of procedural forms, with
substantive due process, which deals with a limitless, open set of substantive
ones.
347
See Black, supra note 345, at 534 (“The predominant meaning [of equal
protection under the law] at any single time has often been more of a reflection
of the cultural context than of an inherent legal principle.”).
343
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application of the “equality” comparison.348 But it would be a mistake to consider the Equal Protection Clause, or equal protection
doctrine, a failure for its inability to land upon a widely shared and
readily applicable rule for determining when the protection of the
law is equal enough for the Constitution.
The value of the rule requiring “equal protection of the law”349
is not primarily in its ability to determine outcomes in cases, it is in
the form it gives to the deliberative process. The Equal Protection
Clause explicitly rejects arguments from inequality (that I should
receive a benefit in order to preserve inequality or that a new inequality should be created to benefit me) and renders irrelevant a
variety of other arguments that do not sound in equality (such as,
that I should receive a benefit if doing so increases net social welfare). Even if the Equal Protection Clause is a failure at determinatively classifying conduct, it is a comparatively modest success by
requiring adjudicators to categorize arguments by their connection
to equality. The Equal Protection Clause does generate outcomes
that themselves shape society,350 but more important than the individual outcomes (America is a fundamentally different place because whites and blacks go to public school together;351 it is not
clear that America is a fundamentally different place because Oklahoma can regulate opticians differently than optometrists352 even
though both outcomes are the product of the Equal Protection
Clause) is that the Equal Protection Clause’s mandate is instantiated in the form of a rule of equality. Relying on the form “equality”
encourages legal actors to make arguments in terms of equality and

348

SCHAUER, supra note 31, at 227 (noting lack of a social understanding of
“equality” sufficient to provide its legal meaning); Peter Westen, The Empty
Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (“Without moral standards,
equality remains meaningless, a formula that can have nothing to say about how
we should act. With such standards, equality becomes superfluous, a formula
that can do nothing but repeat what we already know.”).
349
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
350
See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding state
laws establishing racial segregation in schools to be unconstitutional).
351
Id. at 494–95 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954).
352
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 486, 491 (1955).
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requires courts to explain their decisions in terms of equality.353 By
adopting the form “equal protection,”354 the Constitution injects
equality into the deliberative process and does so even in cases in
which equality provides little guidance as to the right outcome.
Even if equality’s indeterminacy renders it unattainable in practice,
we can all agree that the quest for “equal protection of the laws”355
remains important.
The Constitution is not the sole locus of American aspiration,
but it is an important one,356 and equality is included among its
values by virtue of the form of the Equal Protection Clause. A similar mandate requiring states to treat all citizens with “fairness” or
in accordance with the “law of the land”357 (or simply afford them
“due process of law”358) might drive courts to similar outcomes but
would structure the deliberative inquiry, and the terms of debate,
completely differently. That equality enjoys the position of prominence it does in American constitutional discourse is the product of
the form of the Equal Protection Clause.
3. FORMALISM AS INFORMATION FORCING
This is all a rather long way of saying that formalism’s value is
not in avoiding the indeterminacy and, hence, discretion that Hart
himself identified exists in hard cases;359 it is to enable us to distinguish those cases when discretion is being applied from those
that it is not and to distinguish different kinds of discretion from
each other. A judge applying a speeding law can credibly claim she
is not exercising discretion; a judge applying a reckless driving law
less so. A judge who finds my driving “reckless” has taken for her353

See, e.g., Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–95 (providing an example of “equal
protection” analysis encouraging equality and discouraging inequality).
354
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
355
Id.
356
H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 369, 372–
73, 378–79 (2006).
357
Nachbar, supra note 156, at 1639–40.
358
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking samesex sodomy law for lack of “legitimate state interest” as due process violation),
with id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (finding an equal
protection violation).
359
HART, supra note 2, at 127–28.
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self more authority than one who finds it “over the limit.” Similarly, when the legislature displaces discretion with rules (such as by
setting a numerical blood alcohol limit for drunk-driving violations), it allocates authority away from judges. If rules operate to
allocate discretion away from adjudicators to authors, formalism
allows us to identify whether such an allocation has taken place—it
requires both authors and adjudicators to account for allocations of
authority within the legal system.
4. FORMALISM AND COMMUNICATION
By emphasizing forms over substance, formalism allows the
debate to move up a level of abstraction—from discussion about
individual outcomes to the rules that lead to those outcomes. This
happens at a basic level whenever a court announces not just the
outcome of a case but also the rule that generated the outcome.
Outcomes (“the lower court ruling is affirmed” or “the case is remanded with an instruction to enter judgment for appellant”) do
little to guide behavior; it is the rule announced in a particular case
that provides that guidance.360 Rules categorize,361 and the form
the rule takes drives that categorization. Thus, while formalism is
not the same as rule-based decision-making,362 it is essential to
talking about the rules being applied in a system of rule-based decision-making. Just as it’s hard to compare two tables without talking about attributes of form,363 it’s hard to talk about two rules (or
apply one) without discussing the form they take.
B.
Formalism and the Expressive Function of the Law
Law’s power to communicate has been the focus of much work
on the “expressive function” of the law.364 According to expressive
theories, law not only affects behavior by setting sanctions, behav360

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 802, 808 (1982).
361
See supra Part III.A.1.
362
See supra Part I.A.2.
363
See Weinrib, supra note 8, at 958–59.
364
See generally MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 1–9; Anderson & Pildes,
supra note 34, at 1503 (providing an overview of expressive theories of practical
reason and then arguing that law is expressive in nature).
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iors change according to the message those sanctions convey.365
For instance, imprisonment and fines operate on society differently; the form of a sanction alters its meaning,366 and different rules
can have different “expressive dimensions.”367 Laws alter social
norms by altering the meaning of behavior.368 According to expressive theories, law not only regulates, it communicates.369
As described above, that communication occurs more through
the form of law than through its content. The point is intuitive with
regard to the criminal law. If particular conduct is recognized as
socially undesirable, it can be addressed any number of ways. If
cars driven quickly are dangerous, we can exclude cars from a particular location (like a pedestrian mall), prohibit the selling of cars
capable of exceeding twenty-five miles per hour, provide subsidies
for public transportation, build bike lanes, punish speeders, or outlaw other activities that combine with speed to make cars more
dangerous, such as texting while driving. Even if each choice
equally reduces the number of car-related injuries, it does so in
different ways, and those differences dramatically affect the social
meaning of the underlying conduct. Those differences are realized
by the form of the rule used to effectuate the social goal. The point
is exaggerated in the distinction between subsidizing public transportation and a criminal prohibition on texting, but the same difference in expressive content is presented in the choice to interpret
two different criminal rules. Suppose two possible choices for outlawing texting while driving: a statute that criminalizes texting
while driving or a judicial interpretation of the reckless driving
statute to include texting while driving as “reckless.” A statute outlawing texting while driving carries different meaning than defin365

MCADAMS, supra note 34, at 136–38; Feinberg, supra note 34, at 400;
Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV.
339, 371–72 (2000).
366
Kahan, supra note 34, at 620.
367
Hellman, supra note 34, at 3 n.10. The expressive dimension of a rule is
distinct from the effect that the rule’s substance has on behavior. Compare id.
with Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 946–47 (1995) (on “social meaning” of rules).
368
Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 34, at 2024–25.
369
Id. at 2050 (“For law to perform its expressive function well, it is important that law communicate well.”).
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ing texting while driving as “reckless driving,” and those differences stem from differences in the form of the mandate, even if the
punishment for texting while driving is identical to that for reckless
driving.
The same is true for the inclusion of conduct within the legal
system at all. Waging war against the United States subjects one to
lethal targeting by U.S. armed forces, but it is also punishable as
treason if done by someone who owes allegiance to the United
States.370 Although it is conceivable that the threat of a treason
conviction provides additional deterrent to those citizens considering waging war against the United States, reliance on the criminal
form also conveys American society’s view that those who owe
allegiance to the United States have a distinct duty not to wage war
against the United States;371 a duty that is not conveyed by a more
extreme sanction (lethal targeting, essentially death without legal
process) delivered in another form (as the product of armed conflict).372 Treason’s “wrongness” is communicated by its criminality
in a way that lethal targeting does not. The same is true of America’s drug laws, which not only seek to solve the problem of drug
abuse but to convey a message about drug use through the choice
of means for doing so.373
370

18 U.S.C. § 2381.
Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 155 (1873). On the
Framers’ problematical relationship with treason, see Cramer v. United States,
325 U.S. 1, 8–12 (1945).
372
The same is true of terrorism (punishable under Title 18), although terrorism can exist outside the context of armed conflict and so does not present the
same equality of opportunity for resolution by legal or military means. As a
practical matter, though, the United States considers itself to be in an armed
conflict with any number of organizations that employ terrorism, (including both
al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which means terrorists participating on behalf of either organization subject to three different actions: (1)
criminal conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332; 10 U.S.C. § 950t(2); (2) lethal targeting,
see Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115
Stat. 224, 224 (2001); or (3) to the extent they present a continuing threat to the
United States, detention without trial, see Exec. Order No. 13567, 3 C.F.R.
§ 227 (2011). Defining terrorism as a crime has as much to do with applying the
criminal form to terrorism as it does with either deterring or incapacitating terrorists.
373
See 21 U.S.C. § 801.
371
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And what is true of substance is doubly true of procedure,
which, as described above,374 is explicitly tied to form. The Sixth
Amendment’s situation of juries as criminal adjudicators communicates a message about the relative role of judges and juries,
even in cases in which either would reach an identical result,375 and
even if, as the debate between Justices Scalia and Stevens in Neder
shows, the content of that message is not perfectly clear.376
Although formalist approaches do not necessarily account for
all of these expressive influences of form, formalism itself provides the intellectual space to do so by distinguishing the form of a
rule from both its content and its justification. It is only by considering the forms of law separately—as distinct from driving particular case outcomes—that we can appreciate all of the ways that
forms control how we talk about and consequently think about law.
Law’s form influences behavior and social meaning apart from the
degree to which rules of a particular form instantiate their underlying justifications.
CONCLUSION
Formalism has a long history in American legal thought, serving a primarily antagonistic role in both historical and modern debates.377 But the arguments over formalism made both in support
of formalist methodologies and in derision of them has blinded
many to its deeper meaning. Many criticisms of formalism—both
historical and modern—are really criticisms of the possibility that
law can be perfectly determinative, a question that is not presented
any more centrally by formalism than by other forms of legal
thinking. Holmes, for instance, embraced formality while rejecting
the determinism of legal conceptualism.378 To the extent that the
attack on formalism is motivated by concerns about its determina374

See supra Part II.B.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
376
See Neder v. United States 527 U.S. 1, 28 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
377
See TAMANAHA, supra note 23, at 1–3.
378
See Grey, supra note 104, at 44 (“[G]eneral principles do not decide concrete cases.”(quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
375
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cy,379 those criticisms are misguided, at least as to formalism as
practiced today, which is predicated not on determinacy but rather
on the inherent indeterminacy of law. Another typecast villain,
Lochner v. New York, unites critics of formalism of all stripes by
its purported claim to deterministic simplicity.380 I think such
claims are overstated, but Lochner (and the criticism it has attracted over time) provides a good vehicle for distinguishing determinism from formalism, since Lochner, while possibly falsely deterministic, was hardly formalist.
It is possible to derive from all the heat and light that formalism has generated a definition of formalism that serves not only its
followers but its critics: as commitment to form in legal discourse.
“Commitment to form” may seem like a fairly weak place for a
movement as widely and hotly debated as formalism, but attention
to form can have considerable consequences. Formalism is not agnostic to the effect of those forms—formalism is an argument to
apply the forms of law in preference to deducing the justifications
represented by those forms and attempting to apply those justifications directly. Others have already covered much ground in discussing how paying attention to particular forms (especially text in
both its present and original meanings) can drive outcomes,381 but
formalism is much broader than textualism or originalism: it is a
claim about the role of form more generally and includes arguments about form not specific to text, including claims about the
structure and source of legal materials, claims that resonate in positivist legal thinking. In addition to its contribution to understanding
substance, formalism allows for the independent value of form and
provides a lens through which to realize meaning in law unrecognized by non-formalist methodologies. Hardly an exercise in rigid
thinking, formalism allows for nuance that cannot be captured by
considering law as a system that simply produces legal outcomes.
In the end, formalism is the product of acknowledging that
law’s meaning can only be revealed through its forms. Consequently, it is the forms of law that control the terms by which we
understand and discuss the law; it is the forms of law that provide
379
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the language of the law. The categories required by law’s forms
effectively label conduct, not only as “legal” and “illegal” (which
are outcomes) but also as within or outside of legal review. The
forms of our legal rules drive not only our thinking about legal
questions, but also capture society’s aspirations, even for questions
not readily subject to legal determination.382 By acknowledging the
power of the form of law, formalism offers a richer understanding
of law as an act of communication. In addition to prescribing and
proscribing conduct, forms of law express social values, and formalism is an approach unique in its ability to account for these
widely varying roles of form.
That is not to say that that accounting is complete. Saying that
to ignore form is to miss much of the value of the law does not
answer the question of what role form should serve in any particular context. I have offered only a rudimentary start on that enterprise. By reclaiming the mantel of “formalism” from its role as
both weapon and target and by identifying how it can provide a
unique perspective on law, we can reboot old debates over formalism—to retake formalism from its place as an epithet and allow it
to serve as a vehicle for inquiry into the role and value of form in
the legal system.
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